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ARTICLE
FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL AGENCY REFORM
Gillian E. Metzger*
This Article assesses three major preemption decisions from the
2008-2009 Term-Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, Wyeth v. Levine, and
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n-for theirimplications about the role of
the states in national administrative governance. The Article argues the
decisions are centrally concerned with using state law and preemption analysis to improve federal administrationand police againstfederal agency failure. Federalism clearly factors into the decisions as well, but it does so more
as a mechanism for enhancingfederal agency performance than as a principle worth pursuing in its own right.
The decisions'framingof state law and preemption analysis as mechanisms for improving federal administration,however, stands in sharp contrast with otherjudicialprecedents, in both the preemption and administrative law contexts, in which the Supreme Court has rejected efforts to use state
law and court challenges to police ftderal agency performance. While the
Article explores whether this conflictingjurisprudencecan be explained by a
distinction between direct and indirect efforts at federal agency reform, it
ultimately concludes such a direct-indirect distinction is analytically and
normatively unsatisfying. The Article then considers the possibility that the
Court is instead assigning the states a special role to play in monitoring
federal agencies. Although this account holds potential, the Article argues
that the Court has so farfailed to justify such an approach.
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INTRODUCTION

Preemption has emerged as the contemporary federalism battleground. Struggles over preemption have surfaced repeatedly in recent
years, first over aggressive use of agency preemption by the Bush
Administration, 1 and more recently in connection with the major healthcare and financial sector reforms and proposed climate change legislation. 2 Preemption's dominance is as evident in the judicial sphere, with
1. See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and
State Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l10th Cong. (2007)
(regarding regulatory preemption).
Recent measures proposed by the Obama
Administration expressly limiting preemption reflect the attention the issue has received.
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies re: Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693-94 (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter
Obama Preemption Memo] (regarding preemption).
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 1041-1048, 124 Star. 1376, 2011-19 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5551)
(addressing preservation of state law in conjunction with proposed federal consumer
financial protection legislation); Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733,
111th Cong. § 861 (2009) (proposing preemption of state and local cap-and-trade
programs); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5-6, Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10CV188 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010) (challenging federal
healthcare legislation under Commerce Clause as unconstitutional preemption); Robert
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the federal courts regularly engaging preemption claims in a wide array
of contexts. State and local governments increasingly have protested expansions of federal preemption, and legal scholars have sounded alarms
over the impact of creeping preemption on state governance capacity.3
This was the background against which the Court in its 2008-2009
Term issued three major preemption decisions: Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good,4 Wyeth v. Levine,5 and Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n.6 Notably, preemption claims failed in all three of these closely divided decisions, with
the Court invoking federalism-based presumptions against preemption as
well as the need to respect traditional federal and state functions to guide
its analysis. 7 These decisions, moreover, limit administrative agencies'
preemption powers in ways that could have significant prospective effect
in protecting state law against displacement by executive branch actions.
Pear, State Insurance Experts See Flaws in Obama's Plan to Curb Premiums, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 9, 2010, at A18 (noting issue of preemption of state regulation of health insurance
rate oversight).
3. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, The Preemption War: When Federal Bureaucracies
Trump Local Juries 21 (2008) [hereinafter McGarity, Preemption War] ("The preemption
war is a manifestation of the latest and, in many ways, most threatening attempt to change
state common law by replacing it with a body of regulatory law that is kinder and gentler to
the regulated entities."); William W. Buzbee, Introduction, in Preemption Choice: The
Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism's Core Question 1, 3 (William W. Buzbee ed.,
2009) ("Virtually all chapters in this book contribute to the development of normative
arguments against preemption by using theoretical, legal, and historical analysis to explore
the logic behind the long dominant choice of retention of federal, state, local, and
common law regulatory power."); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:
Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227, 242 (2007)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble] ("Should this regulatory preemption
trend continue . . . [a]gencies would be selectively empowered to act in one direction
only-to oust competing state power ....
); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two
Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 130 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Two Federalisms] ("The
whole point of preemption is generally to force national uniformity on a particular
issue, stifling state-by-state diversity and experimentation."); Law & Criminal Justice
Comm., Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, Preemption Monitor, April 7, 2010, at
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20109 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reviewing recently enacted federal legislation that preempts state authority). Not all
academic treatments have viewed increased preemption negatively. See generally Federal
Preemption: States' Powers, National Interests (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve
eds., 2007) (discussing benefits of modern preemption doctrine).
4. 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
5. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
6. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009). A fourth decision, Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108
(2009), could also be conceptualized as a preemption case, as the Court there invalidated
on Supremacy Clause grounds a state law that barred a prisoner from bringing a suit for
money damages against correction officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the question
at issue in Haywood-the extent to which state courts are required to hear claims based on
federal law-involves a distinct body of law and the Court did not approach the case
through the lens of its preemption jurisprudence.
7. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717-18, 2720-21 (considering incursion on traditional
state powers); Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95, 1199-200 (invoking presumption against
preemption); Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543-44 & n.6 (considering clear statement rule especially
important in "field traditionally occupied by the States").
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Further, the Court's refusal to defer to the pro-preemption views of the
administrative agencies involved in Wyeth and Cuomo indicates that a majority of Justices view preemption determinations as different from other
statutory interpretation questions-a difference that appears to turn on
the federalism effects of preemption.8
The impact of these decisions on tort litigation and preemption analysis generally is likely to be significant, at least in the short term. Wyeth is
particularly portentous given its importance for failure-to-warn and other
drug-related state law tort suits. 9 More broadly, the decisions signal some
judicial resistance towards statutory interpretations or other administrative efforts that aggressively expand the preemptive scope of federal action. In light of the close votes in these cases and Justice Stevens's pivotal
role in opposing preemption, whether these decisions have a longer lasting effect is harder to predict. 10 The decisions themselves also leave
open some important questions, such as the preemptive effect of a regulation with legal force. 1 The Obama Administration's greater resistance
to preemption may mean that it will be a while before such questions are
resolved. 12
Even more interesting, however, is how the decisions frame the relationship between the states and federal agencies and what they suggest
about the role of the states in national administrative governance. A
striking feature of the decisions is the extent to which they are centrally
concerned with using state law and preemption analysis to improve federal agency performance-what I refer to here as federal agency reform.
This focus is particularly salient in Wyeth, which argued that the potential
for state liability assisted federal regulators by giving regulated entities an
incentive to disclose evidence of potential risks. Wyeth also used judicial
control over preemption determinations to encourage greater agency
sensitivity to state interests. 13 Wyeth's concern with federal agency per8. See infra text accompanying notes 57-65.
9. See Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 391-96 (7th Cir. 2010)
(calling Wyeth "our intellectual anchor" in holding failure-to-warn claim was not
preempted by federal regulation); Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 433-35, 437-39,
445-49 (5th Cir. 2010) (relying on Wyeth to hold FDA regulation did not preempt state
failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturer); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603,
607-12 (8th Cir. 2009) (relying on Wyeth to conclude that "[tihe obligation [plaintiff]
seeks to impose upon generic manufacturers does not obstruct the purposes and objectives
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments [to the FDCA] in any way"); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Drug Advertising Claims: Preemption's New Frontier, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1625, 1625-26,
1647 (2008) (noting, pre-Wyeth "all eyes are on Wyeth" and "[t]he courts are roughly evenly
split on the question [of preemption of failure-to-warn claims] and await guidance from
the United States Supreme Court").
10. Justice Stevens, who retired at the end of last Term, wrote both Altria and Wyeth
and was one of the most consistent anti-preemption votes on the Court.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
12. See Obama Preemption Memo, supra note 1, at 24,693-94 (imposing restrictions
on preemption assertions by heads of departments and agencies).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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formance is also present in the other decisions, which portray state enforcement as complementing federal administration and serving to avoid
regulatory gaps. Traditional federalism concerns about protecting the
states from unjustified national intrusions clearly factored into the
Court's analysis as well. Yet, in the end, the decisions seem to treat the
preservation of state authority less as a goal worth pursuing in its own
right than instrumentally as an important mechanism for guarding
against federal agency failure.
In arguing that the recent preemption decisions use preemption
analysis to improve federal regulation and federal agency performance, I
do not mean to suggest that this goal was consciously or actually animating the Court. It may have been, but other motivations are equally possible. To a significant degree, the Justices' differing stances on preemption
tracked the division between liberals and conservatives on the Court, suggesting that a major driver behind the decisions may be different ideological stances on tort reform and the benefits of regulation. 14 At a minimum, the inconsistencies across recent preemption precedent and
among the positions of different Justices make it clear that "the Court"
itself lacks a coherent view on most questions relating to preemption.
This area of jurisprudence is a prime occasion for remembering that the
Court, like Congress, "is a they, not an it."15
Instead, my claim is that reading the decisions as fundamentally concerned with improving federal administration and the potential for federal agency failure offers the most analytically coherent account of the
decisions, whatever the Justices' actual motivations. At the same time,
however, this account underscores tensions between the recent preemption decisions and other lines of the Court's jurisprudence. In particular,
the decisions stand in sharp contrast with other recent preemption precedent in which the Court has rejected efforts to use state tort law to police
14. This account gains support not simply from the voting pattern in these decisions,
in which the liberal Justices voted unanimously against preemption and the conservative
Justices largely in favor, but also in scholarship documenting a probusiness trend on the
Roberts Court. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court?
Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 1019, 1019 (2009) ("[I]n the less than three full Terms of the Roberts Court, the
Chamber [of Commerce] has been not only unusually active but unusually
successful . . . ."). It should be noted, however, that the Court's recent preemption
jurisprudence is not entirely reducible to a liberal-conservative ideological dispute. For
example, the voting patterns in Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (eight Justices
supporting preemption of state tort suit), and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1
(2007) (decision supporting preemption written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
"liberal" Justices Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Alito over dissent by Justice Stevens, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia), do not fit the purely ideological story.
15. Kenneth A. Schepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 244 (1992); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 1020 (2009) (extrapolating to context of
the Court). For a discussion of some points of overall agreement among the Justices, see
infra text accompanying note 56.
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federal regulation. 16 They are also at odds with administrative law decisions rejecting efforts to use the courts to broadly reform federal administration. 17 To be sure, courts routinely entertain challenges to particular
agency actions, often overturning agency determinations as contrary to
statutory requirements, insufficiently reasoned, and the like. But lawsuits
targeting agency performance more generally have found little judicial
receptivity.18 In the recent decisions rejecting preemption, however, the
Court underscored concerns about just such broader administrative performance. Unfortunately, the Court itself neither explained nor acknowledged these tensions in its jurisprudence, and thus offered little guidance
for how we should make sense of the divergence.
This Article first explores the connection between the states and federal agency reform immanent in the preemption decisions and then assesses whether grounds exist to distinguish the recent preemption decisions from other precedent more hostile to policing federal
administration through the courts. A possible explanation of the Court's
conflicting jurisprudence, and the one on which I focus here, is that it
reflects a distinction between direct and indirect efforts at federal agency
reform. The key difference between these two approaches is the extent
to which federal administrative policies or actions are explicitly challenged. Direct reform efforts specifically target an agency's policies and
actions; indirect reform efforts seek to influence how federal agencies
function in a more roundabout way. A suit seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against a federal agency for failing to meet its statutory responsibilities is the paradigmatic example of a direct agency reform effort, but
direct targeting of federal agency action can take other forms as well.
Thus, I include in this category other efforts that call the validity of federal administrative actions into question, such as tort actions against federal officers or tort actions between private parties alleging that federal
administrative decisions were fraudulently obtained. 19 Indeed, even a
state statute that seeks to reinforce federal regulation by expressly tying
state law liability to violation of federal requirements is arguably an instance of direct targeting and best viewed as a direct effort at federal
agency reform. 20 As portrayed in Wyeth, by contrast, state law and judicial
preemption analysis improve federal administration in an indirect fashion. They provide information and incentives to encourage better federal regulatory performance, but federal agencies retain control over
whether they alter their behavior in response. Significantly, the Court's
resistance to efforts to improve federal administration has occurred in
contexts in which federal agency performance was more directly targeted
by the federal and state law claims involved.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

Part H.A.
Part HI.B.
text accompanying notes 183-190.
text accompanying notes 211-217, 258-261.
text accompanying notes 236-243.
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A distinction between direct and indirect efforts to improve agency
performance has some real bite, particularly in the federalism sphere.
Independent state measures that affect federal agencies only indirectly
have a strong intuitive claim to presumptive legitimacy, whereas certain
state law efforts to directly challenge federal administration are appropriately viewed as presumptively preempted. I ultimately conclude, however, that drawing such a firm distinction is analytically and normatively
unsatisfying. State measures do not clearly sort into direct and indirect
categories, and even indisputably indirect measures can have a significant
impact on federal agency operations. Nor, moreover, do direct state efforts to alter federal administration necessarily run afoul of constitutional
federalism principles. Instead, in our contemporary world of concurrent
federal and state authority and an ever-expanding national administrative
state, some direct state targeting of federal agencies-including even
state law claims that may call the validity of federal administrative decisions into question-seems both constitutionally legitimate and functionally necessary if states are to play a meaningful governance role.
This leaves the possibility of a more radical account of the relationship between the states and federal agencies, one which would assign the
states a special role in policing and reforming federal administrationboth directly and indirectly. Although this possibility gains some support
from Wyeth and other recent precedent, it potentially portends a dramatic departure from existing jurisprudence. More importantly, the
Court has so far failed to provide crucial clarification for such an approach, both with respect to the scope of the states' role and the underlying justification for assigning them special responsibilities to improve federal administration.
Part I of what follows outlines the three preemption decisions and
briefly discusses their implications for current preemption debates. It
then turns to assessing the extent to which the decisions are best viewed
as an effort to vindicate the constitutional federal structure, concluding
that federalism alone fails to fully explain the decisions. Instead, fears of
agency failure appear a more central dynamic, with the decisions strategically using state law and preemption analysis as mechanisms for improving federal administrative performance. Part II contrasts this emphasis
on improving federal performance with both the Court's resistance to
fraud-on-the-agency claims and its administrative law precedent rejecting
challenges to agency policy and performance. It argues that what distinguishes the recent preemption decisions is their indirect regulatory approach. Part III then assesses the extent to which an indirect approach to
improving federal agency performance is either functionally superior or
constitutionally mandated. After finding the distinction between direct
and indirect efforts at federal agency reform ultimately unsatisfying, Part
III also considers the possibility of a broader role for the states in reforming federal administration.
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FEDERALISM AS CORE OR FEDERALISM AS PERIPHERY?

21
Preemption disputes are a staple of the Supreme Court's docket,
resulting in both a substantial preemption jurisprudence and an evergrowing academic commentary. That commentary has been increasingly
critical of late, as scholars have faulted the Court's performance on preemption questions on a number of grounds: for deviating from constitutional text and structure; 22 for being insufficiently sensitive or overly sensitive to state interests; 2 3 for ignoring important political or regulatory

21. Michael Greve and Jonathan Klick report that the Court has had an average ofjust
under six preemption cases on its docket per term from October Term (O.T.) 1986 to
O.T. 2003. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 49 (2006). After its three
major preemption decisions in O.T. 2008, the Court granted certiorari in only two
preemption-related cases in O.T. 2009. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (holding state civil procedure rule preempted by federal
class action rule for diversity suits in federal court); Pollitt v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 558
F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 396 (2009), and cert. dismissed, 130 S. Ct.
1574 (2010) (holding "complete preemption" does not apply to field of health insurance
coverage for federal employees). As of September 2010, however, the Court has four
preemption cases on its docket for O.T. 2010. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322
(2010) (preemption under Federal Arbitration Act); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233 (3d
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010) (preemption under Vaccine Act);
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub
nom., Chamber. of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010) (preemption under
Immigration Reform and Control Act); Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 84 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 545 (Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3348 (2010) (preemption under
federal motor vehicle safety standards).
22. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085,
2096 (2000) ("[C]onstitutional text, structure, and history does not support the
application of the assumption in all contexts as a general presumption against
preemption."); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 293 (2000) ("A general rule
that express preemption clauses should be read 'narrowly,' so that they contradict the
fewest potential state laws, is hard to square with the Supremacy Clause's non obstante
provision."). But see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1429 (2001) ("[C]ontrary to Professor Dinh's assessment,
the constitutional structure appears to favor a presumption against preemption because
the Constitution gives states a role in selecting Congress and the President, but not federal
courts.").
23. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 22, at 2097 (arguing presumption against preemption
is too sensitive to state interests); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 3, at 130-33 (urging
greater sensitivity to state interests); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1372 (2006) (describing trend toward
greater federalization).
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features; 24 and for being inconsistent.2 5 Such claims of inconsistency
have underscored the variation both in the Court's stated analysis, especially in its invocation of the presumption against preemption, and in its
application of governing doctrine in different cases. 2 6 The Court's most
recent preemption decisions provide more fodder for those debates. The
discussion below begins with a brief overview of the decisions and analysis
of their import for preemption doctrine. It then assesses the extent to
which the decisions are best explained by federalism principles rather
than alternative concerns. Rejecting a straightforward federalism analysis, it concludes that agency failure is the central analytic theme in the
decisions, with federalism in the form of state law and preemption analysis serving primarily as a mechanism for improving federal agency
performance.
A. Setting the Stage: The 2008-2009 Term Preemption Decisions
In the ongoing debate over preemption, two issues have taken
center stage: the authority of federal administrative agencies to preempt state law,2 7 and protections against preemption of state tort
24. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and
the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1554-55 (2007) (emphasizing
importance of differentiating between federal floors and ceilings in assessing preemption
claims); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (2007) [hereinafter Hills, Against
Preemption] (arguing preemption rules should be structured to foster congressional
action); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism
Theory, and Default Rules, in Federal Preemption: States' Powers, National Interests,
supra note 3, at 166, 183-85, 187-88 (emphasizing importance of subject matter and state
externalities in analyzing preemption questions).
25. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 22, at 2085 ("Notwithstanding its repeated claims to
the contrary, the Supreme Court's numerous preemption cases follow no predictable
jurisprudential or analytical pattern."); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and
Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 687-88 (1991) ("[Tlhe United States
Supreme Court has failed to articulate a coherent standard for deciding preemption cases,
and its haphazard approach fails to provide meaningful guidance to lower courts,
legislators, and citizens."); Nelson, supra note 22, at 232 ("Most commentators who write
about preemption agree on at least one thing: Modern preemption jurisprudence is a
muddle.").
26. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More
Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 197, 221 (2009) ("[T]he Court's
invocation and use of the presumption against preemption has been quite inconsistent.");
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 449, 458 n.30 (2008) [hereinafter, Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption)
(collecting sources).
27. For recent scholarship addressing this issue, see generally William W. Buzbee,
Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and
Intergenerational Equity, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1521 (2009) [hereinafter Buzbee, Hard
Look]; Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L.J. 1933 (2008); Nina A.
Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695 (2008)
[hereinafter Mendelson, Presumption]; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional
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law. 28 These two issues are often intertwined, as administrative action has
become a prime basis for claims of state tort law preemption and administrative agencies have intentionally sought to wield their powers to that
effect. Both administrative preemption and tort preemption have surfaced increasingly in recent preemption cases, but were often sidestepped
by the Court in its opinions. 29 In the 2008-2009 Term, however, the
Court addressed both issues more directly in three major decisions: Altria
Group, Inc. v. Good, Wyeth v. Levine, and Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n.
Each involved preemption claims based on federal agency action, with
Altria and Wyeth also addressing the question of preemption in the context of state law tort claims. Notably, the Court rejected the preemption
claims in all three decisions, a result somewhat at odds with the trend of
the Court's preemption jurisprudence over the last decade.3 0 Moreover,
the results in these decisions arguably conflicted with several of the
Court's recent preemption decisions-a point made by the dissent in
3
each case. '
Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727 (2008) [hereinafter Merrill, Institutional Choice]; Gillian
E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023 (2008)
[hereinafter Metzger, New Federalism]; Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 869 (2008).
28. For discussion of the issue of tort law preemption, see generally Richard A.
Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev.
463 (2009); Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation:
Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 73 (2008); Mark Seidenfeld, Who
Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. Ann.
Surv. Am. L. 611 (2010); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 3; Sharkey,
Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26; Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption:
When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, J. Tort L., Dec. 2006.
29. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20 (2007) ("[U]nder our
interpretation of the statute, the level of deference owed to the regulation is an academic
question.").
30. Jonathan Klick and Michael Greve report that the Rehnquist Court ruled in favor
of preemption approximately half the time, though Catherine Sharkey has noted this rate
increases to 60% in tort preemption cases. Compare Greve & Klick, supra note 21, at 57
tbl.5 (reporting 52% of Rehnquist Court's 105 preemption rulings found state action
preempted), with Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 454 n.14
(noting Greve & Klick found "62.5% preemption rate in thirty-two cases involving
preemption of state common-law tort claims from 1986 to 2004"). More recent data
compiled by Michael Greve and Michael Petrino lists twelve preemption cases decided by
the Roberts Court from O.T. 2005 through O.T. 2008, and by my count preemption claims
succeeded in seven, or 58%. Michael Greve & Michael Petrino, Implied-Express
Preemption Breakdown, October Term 1986-2008 (unpublished data set) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
31. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2730-31 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting "[t ] he Court's conclusion in Watters that
[the National Bank Act] deprives the States of inspection and enforcement authority over
the mortgage-lending practices of national banks lends weight to the agency's construction
of the statute" at issue here); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217, 1220-22 (2009) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (arguing majority's holding "cannot be reconciled with Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 [(2000)]"); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 552,
558-60 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that, particularly in light of Court's
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1. The Decisions: Altria, Wyeth, and Cuomo. - In Altria, Maine
smokers brought an action under that state's Unfair Trade Practices Act
alleging that a tobacco company had deceived them with respect to the
levels of tar and nicotine they would receive from smoking its light cigarettes. The essence of the smokers' claim was that the company knew
that smokers of light cigarettes unconsciously engage in compensating
behaviors, such as blocking filter holes, which means they inhale more tar
and nicotine than accounted for by measurements under the standard
Cambridge Filter Method. The company responded by invoking both express and obstacle preemption. It argued that the suit was preempted
both by the express preemption clause of the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act and because liability would be an obstacle to a
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policy encouraging reliance on the
32
Cambridge Filter Method for tar and nicotine yields.
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court rejected both
preemption arguments. Following the earlier plurality opinion in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, the majority held that the Labeling Act's express
preemption clause encompassed only state law rules targeted at smoking
and health, and accordingly did not reach a state law claim alleging
breach of a general duty not to deceive. 33 Justice Thomas's dissent contended that the majority's approach was incapable of consistent application and represented an unduly narrow view of the clause. 34 The majority further concluded that the FTC in fact had no such policy as the
company described, leaving open whether "a regulatory policy could provide a basis for obstacle pre-emption."3 5 According to the majority, the
most the record revealed in support of the company's argument was a
"handful of industry guidances and consent orders" allowing use of the
Cambridge Filter Method and "FTC[ ] inaction with regard to 'light'
descriptors," but "agency nonenforcement of a federal statute is not the
36
same as a policy of approval."
Two grounds for preemption were also asserted in Wyeth. Wyeth began as a state court tort action in which ajury found a drug manufacturer
liable for failing to warn about dangers associated with direct injection of
an antinausea medication into patients' veins. The manufacturer first asserted impossibility preemption, arguing that it could not comply with a
state law duty to modify the label of the drug, Phenergan, without violating federal laws restricting a drug manufacturer's ability to alter a drug
decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), "there is no authority for [the
majority's] invoking the presumption against pre-emption in express pre-emption cases,"
and that majority's reading of the Labeling Act was also undermined by Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).
32. Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 541-42.
33. Id. at 545-49 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality
opinion)).
34. Id. at 555-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 549-51 (majority opinion).
36. Id. at 550-51.
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label without prior approval from the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) .7 It also invoked obstacle preemption, maintaining that allowing
state law liability for failure to warn about dangers associated with a drug
would pose an obstacle to achieving Congress's objectives in the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of assigning responsibility for drug labeling decisions to the FDA. 38 In the preamble of a recently promulgated
drug labeling regulation, the FDA had espoused a similar view, declaring
that state law failure-to-warn actions "threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible for evaluating and
regulating drugs" and therefore "FDA approval of labeling... preempts
conflicting or contrary State law."3 9
Once again the Court rejected both arguments for preemption, this
40
time by a 6-3 margin, with Justice Thomas concurring in the result.
Justice Stevens's majority opinion concluded that under governing regulations the manufacturer could have added a stronger warning in light of
accumulating evidence of the dangers of direct IV administration, and
that the FDA had not prohibited strengthening the warning in such a
fashion. 4 1 The majority also rejected the view that state failure-to-warn
suits would prove an obstacle to achieving Congress's objectives for drug
regulation in the FDCA, arguing that the claim of FDA exclusivity was not
supported by the statute's text, history, or purpose of furthering consumer protection. 4 2 Particularly notable was the majority's refusal to
grant the FDA's contrary view any weight as a result of procedural deficiencies and inconsistencies in the agency's position over time. 43 The
dissenting Justices, in an opinion by Justice Alito, agreed with the manufacturer that preemption was appropriate on both impossibility and obstacle preemption grounds. 44 The most radical view was that espoused by
Justice Thomas, who contended in his concurrence that the very idea of
45
obstacle preemption was constitutionally illegitimate.
Cuomo differed from the others not only in arising outside the tort
context, but also because it involved a state attorney general's effort to
enforce state law and a federal agency as a party seeking a declaration of
preemption. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
along with a banking trade group, argued that state officials were preempted from seeking to enforce state laws against national banks by the
general prohibition on state exercise of "visitorial powers" over national
37. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193, 1196 (2009).
38. Id. at 1193, 1199.
39. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified in
scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.).
40. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196-204.
41. Id. at 1196-99.
42. Id. at 1199-200.
43. Id. at 1200-03.
44. Id. at 1220 (Alito, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1205, 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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banks in the National Bank Act (NBA). The OCC had previously issued a
regulation interpreting "visitorial powers" to include enforcing compliance with state and federal law.4 6 The Court in a 5-4 decision rejected
the OCC's broad claim of preemption. 47 The majority opinion, this time
authored by Justice Scalia, held that the OCC's regulation interpreting
visitorial powers to include suit by a state attorney general to enforce state
law was not a credible reading of the statute. 48 The majority agreed, however, that the NBA precluded state administrative investigatory and super4
visory efforts unrelated to bringing a judicial enforcement action. 1
Justice Thomas's dissent contended that the OCC's regulation represented a perfectly reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
term by the agency charged with implementing the statute and deserved
50
the Court's deference.
2. The Decisions' Import for Preemption Analysis. - The fact that these
cases were all decided by close votes and contained vigorous dissents indicates that the Court remains quite divided about preemption. It is thus
hard to assess the long-term impact the decisions will have, especially on
highly disputed issues, such as how broadly or narrowly to read an express
preemption clause, on which the Court seemed to deviate from recent
precedent. 5 1 Moreover, some key questions were left open, in particular
the extent to which federal administrative regulations with the force of
law-that is, substantive regulations or decisions that impose binding legal obligations, as opposed to regulations that simply interpret governing
statutes or provide general guidance-can preempt state law. 52 Also un46. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714-15 (2009).
47. Id. at 2721-22. Subsequently, the result in Cuomo was expressly sanctioned in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1047, 124 Stat. 1376, 2018 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b, 1465).
48. Cuomo, 129 S.Ct. at 2715-19. The Court also rejected the OCC's interpretation of
its regulation as not preempting state enforcement of general legal requirements, such as
state contract law, as at odds with the text of the regulation as well as the NBA. Id. at
2719-20.
49. Id. at 2721-22.
50. Id. at 2722-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Compare Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (choosing narrow
reading of express preemption clause disfavoring preemption and refusing to find implied
preemption), with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008) (reading express
preemption clauses to find preemption), Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
550-51 (2001) (same), and Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-86 (2000)
(finding implied preemption after refusing to find preemption based on express
preemption clause).
52. In Wyeth, the Court noted that it had previously held "an agency regulation with
the force of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements," but emphasized that it was
"faced with no such regulation" here and had "no occasion in this case to consider the preemptive effect of a specific agency regulation bearing the force of law," distinguishing Geier
on this ground. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-01, 1203 (2009). Although the
majority appeared to leave this question open, Justice Breyer made clear in his
concurrence that in his view agencies could issue specific regulations with legal force that
have preemptive effect. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring). This was also the view of the
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clear is whether the Court will require an express delegation by Congress
of preemptive authority for such an agency regulation to have preemptive
effect,5 3 and the extent to which an agency must have demonstrably con54
sidered an issue to support a claim of actual conflict.
Nonetheless, the decisions, especially Wyeth, mark a significant contribution to the Court's preemption jurisprudence. To begin with, they
indicate that the Court continues to believe that liability under state common law can constitute a state law requirement or prohibition for purthree dissenting Justices in Wyeth, who argued that the relevant FDA actions in fact had
legal force and defended the result in Geier. Id. at 1227-29 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas's position on this issue is much harder to parse. He was the sole
Justice expressly to renounce the Geier decision, but his objection to Geier-which also
animated his concurrence in Wyeth-was opposition to obstacle preemption, under which
state laws are displaced on the grounds that they are an obstacle to the achievement of
general congressional purposes and objectives. Id. at 1211-17 (Thomas, J., concurring).
As a result, it seems possible thatJustice Thomas might support preemption when state law
clearly conflicts with a valid regulation that has independent legal force, though it seems
likely he would require clear congressional authorization of such preemptive authority.
See id. at 1215 ("The Court's 'purposes and objectives' pre-emption jurisprudence is ...
problematic because it encourages an overly expansive reading of statutory text."); see also
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(justifying deference to OCC's view of NBA's preemptive scope on grounds that statute
includes express preemption clause and thus Congress made decision to preempt, not the
agency).
53. In Wyeth, the majority emphasized the fact that "Congress has not authorized the
FDA to pre-empt state law directly" as another reason why deference to the FDA's views on
preemption would be inappropriate. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1201. It did not specify, however,
exactly how such an authorization would affect the preemption analysis and in particular
whether clear congressional authorization is necessary for an agency regulation with the
force of law to have preemptive effect. Justice Thomas would appear to require such clear
authorization, see supra note 52, whereas the fact that Justice Breyer was willing to allow
FDA regulations with legal force to have preemptive effect indicates he would not impose
such a requirement, see Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring), and neither
would the three dissenting Justices, see id. at 1220, 1227-30 (Alito,J., dissenting). Neither
Cuomo nor Altria addressed the question-although the Cuomo majority's refusal to defer
to the OCC's regulation interpreting the ambiguous term "visitorial powers," combined
with its insistence that this interpretation was in substance no different than a declaration
of preemptive effect, suggests that more authorization of administrative preemption than
simply an express preemption clause is needed for the agency's views on preemption to get
strong deference. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721 (describing OCC regulation at issue as
interpretive and declaratory of NBA's preemptive force); see also William Funk, Judicial
Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 1233, 1242-49
(2010) [hereinafter Funk, Judicial Deference] (discussing role of statutory authorization in
assessing whether agency views on preemption get deference). Some scholars have
advocated requiring such clear authorization for agencies to have power to preempt. See,
e.g., Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 27, at 699 (advocating clear statement rule);
Merrill, Institutional Choice, supra note 27, at 767 (advocating "super-strong" clear
statement rule). But see Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2071-72 (arguing
clear statement rule is at odds with current administrative law and "would create
extraordinary obstacles to federal administrative governance").
54. See Douglas G. Smith, Preemption After Wyeth v.Levine, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1435,
1436-37 (2009) (arguing Wyeth suggests preemption is available when "the FDA has
specifically considered the particular risks at issue").
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poses of an express preemption clause. That view was a largely unstated
but necessary assumption of Altria and Wyeth. 55 It also is a point of growing consistency in recent preemption decisions, with the Court strongly
adhering to the view that common law liability constitutes a requirement
the Term before in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 56 The Court also remains
committed to the possibility that state law liability might be impliedly preempted because it creates an impermissible obstacle to achievement of
federal statutory objectives and purposes, even if such liability is not at
odds with the text of governing federal laws. None of the other Justices
in Wyeth joined Justice Thomas's concurrence attacking the legitimacy of
obstacle preemption. Their disagreement was not over the acceptability
of obstacle preemption in principle, but rather over its application to the
case at hand.
More important is Wyeth's insistence that conclusions of preemptive
effect are ultimately for the courts to make in their independent judgment, at least absent an express delegation to an agency of preemptive
authority. 57 Although a court may give weight to an agency's "explanation of state law's impact on the federal scheme," it appears that without
such an express delegation agencies generally receive at best limited deference of the Skidmore variety for their preemption determinations. 5 8 In
55. Although Altria involved suit based on Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act, the
Court largely treated the case as involving preemption of a common law fraud rule. The
Court noted its earlier opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-23
(1992) (plurality opinion), had read "the Labeling Act to pre-empt common-law rules as
well as positive enactments," and then applied the test the Cipollone plurality had used to
"determine whether a particular common-law claim is pre-empted" to conclude that
preemption was unwarranted here. Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 545-48. In Wyeth, the Court
strongly suggested that it might have found the common law failure-to-warn claim at issue
preempted had the FDCA contained an express preemption clause similar to that
contained in the Medical Devices Act of 1976, which prohibits any state "requirement"
relating to "the safety or effectiveness" of a device that is "different from, or in addition to"
federal requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006); Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200 ("If Congress
thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an
express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA's 70-year history.").
56. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323-25. The identification of common law liability as a
requirement was first made by the plurality opinion in Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522-23, and
then called into question by intervening decisions. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537
U.S. 51, 63-64 (2002) (holding that statutory reference to a "law or regulation" in express
preemption clause, combined with savings clause, meant Congress did not intend to
include common law claims (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2000))); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 487-91, 502-03 (1996) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing Cipollone based on
potentially "far greater interference with state legal remedies" from preemption in
Medtronic context). The Court also held that common law duties, but not a tort verdict,
could be state law requirements in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443-46,
454 (2005) (calling tort verdict "[a]n occurrence that merely motivates an optional
decision," not preemptive "requirement").
57. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
58. Id.; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("The weight of
[the Administrator's] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:1

emphasizing the need for independent judicial determination of preemption and limited agency deference, Wyeth clarifies a frequent issue of
dispute in preemption cases. 59 Cuomo's subsequent invocation of the
Chevron framework instead of Skidmore surely muddies the waters a bit.
This difference, however, may just reflect that preemption in Cuomo
turned on the meaning of an express preemption clause rather than an
implied preemption analysis assessing the impact of state law on the over60
all federal scheme.
In any event, what is more noteworthy about Cuomo is the extent to
which the majority opinion deviates from ordinary Chevron review by refusing to defer to the OCC's regulation interpreting "visitorial powers" in
the NBA, despite acknowledging that this term was ambiguous and the
regulation had been promulgated using full notice-and-comment procedures. 61 Under established Chevron/Mead analysis, an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term promulgated using full rulemaking
procedures ordinarily receives substantial deference. 62 That the Wyeth
Court did not grant greater deference to the FDA's view of FDCA's preemptive effect is less surprising, given the procedural deficiencies that
marred the FDA's adoption of this view as part of the drug labeling rule
and its inclusion only in the rule's preamble. 63 On the other hand,
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control."). For a similar conclusion, see Funk, Judicial Deference, supra note 53,
at 1251-52 (finding courts apply "weak or Skidmore deference"); see also Bhagwat, supra
note 26, at 207 ("Note that adding up these votes, five of the currentJustices have joined
opinions disclaiming deference to agency findings of preemption.").
59. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326-27 (suggesting Skidmore deference); Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20-21 & n.13 (2007) (refusing to address level of
deference owed OCC regulation). The question of what deference, if any, to accord
administrative interpretations of preemptive effects has received substantial academic
commentary. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev.
737, 758-98 (2004) [hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron] (arguing against Chevron deference
for agency views on preemption and in favor of Skidmore on case-by-case basis); Merrill,
Institutional Choice, supra note 27, at 769-79 (arguing for deference regarding need for,
and consequence of, displacing state law if agency has expertise in area); Sharkey, Products
Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 491-99 (arguing for Skidmore deference).
60. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009); see also id. at
2732 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing agency did not
declare preemptive scope of NBA but instead interpreted term in statute's preemption
clause).
61. See id. at 2715 (majority opinion) (noting "some ambiguity as to the meaning of
'visitorial powers'" and insisting that Court could nonetheless "discern the outer limits of
the term ...

through the clouded lens of history").

62. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (noting "an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking" is often
good evidence Congress intended its statutory interpretations to receive deference); see
also Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2063-68 (describing other recent
decisions in which Court appeared to engage in unusually searching statutory scrutiny in
cases involving federalism issues).
63. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (outlining deficiencies); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at
228-31 (concluding classification rulings at issue "present a case far removed . . .from
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Wyeth's insistence on at best limited deference to agency views on preemption, even when contained in regulations having the force of law, also
64
marks a deviation from standard Cheuron analysis.
It seems therefore that both Wyeth and Cuomo pull out administrative
preemption determinations for different judicial treatment than administrative determinations usually receive. 65 Also striking, however, is Wyeth's
use of administrative law to encourage more careful agency assessments
of preemption-evident in the majority's criticism of the FDA's failure to
provide states with notice and an opportunity to comment on its changed
preemption views or a detailed defense of that change. 66 These requirements of detailed explanation and justification for change are standard
administrative law requirements for reasoned administrative decisionmaking, appearing under "hard look" arbitrary and capriciousness review
as well as Skidmore scrutiny.6 7 Moreover, this use by the majority of ordinary administrative law to police administrative preemption determinations appears intentional, given the opinion's statement that the Court
notice-and-comment process" and therefore not entitled to Chevron deference); cf. Riegel,
552 U.S. at 338 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting FDA's "amicus brief interpreting a
statute is entitled, at most," to Skidmore deference).
64. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27 ("[A] dministrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority."). The question of whether courts should defer to agency views of preemptive
effect contained in agency regulations that have the force of law is distinct from the
question of whether substantive requirements contained in such regulations have
preemptive effect. As noted above, the latter issue is one the Court had "no occasion... to
consider" in Wyeth. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203; supra note 52.
65. Wyeth's insistence on independent judicial determination of preemption supports
my colleague Thomas Merrill's suggestion that the Court is developing a special review
doctrine for preemption. See Merrill, Institutional Choice, supra note 27, at 766-69.
66. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201-03.
67. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
51-52 (1983) (noting that under arbitrary and capricious review "the agency must explain
the evidence which is available, and must offer a 'rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made'" (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810
(2009) (holding no heightened standard for decisions to change agency policy). An
important difference between hard look review and the approach outlined in Wyeth is that
agency explanations failing the former are remanded to the agency for further
consideration, whereas flawed agency preemption determinations are simply given no
weight by courts in their own preemption analysis. Nonetheless, in substance the two are
closely similar. For arguments that courts should subject agency preemption
determinations and other agency decisions with federalism implications to hard look
arbitrary and capriciousness review, see Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at
2104-07. A number of scholars have advocated this approach to preemption
determinations. See, e.g., Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 27, at 1524-25; Galle &
Seidenfeld, supra note 27, at 2001; Karen A. Jordan, Opening the Door to "Hard-Look"
Review of Agency Preemption, 31 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 353, 353 (2009); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 Duke L.J. 2125,
2185-86 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism Accountability].

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:1

would vary the degree of weight it assigned to an agency's views based on
the "thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness" of the agency's account. 68 The clear lesson for agencies is that they need to involve states
in their preemption decisionmaking and offer well reasoned, expertisebased justifications for their views, carefully explaining any change in
their position on preemption over time, if they want those views to be
69
given weight by a court.
B. Wat's Federalism Got to Do with It?
One way of understanding these decisions is that they reflectjudicial
unease over increasing federal displacement of state law and state regulatory authority. Elsewhere I have argued that several recent decisions appear to be using familiar administrative law doctrines, including a de
70
facto more rigorous Chevron scrutiny, to address federalism concerns.
Viewed in this light, the 2008-2009 Term preemption decisions appear of
a piece with this trend in the Court's precedent. While I ultimately conclude federalism is not the dynamic driving the decisions, it is undeniably
an important factor in play. 71 Both the Altria and Wyeth majorities prominently invoked the presumption against preemption at the outset of their
analyses, emphasizing that "we begin our analysis 'with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
[a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.'"72 Altria's invocation of the presumption was particularly notable given the presence of an express preemption clause in the Labeling
Act, and the majority's insistence that the presumption against preemption should apply even in cases of express preemption provoked sharp
disagreement from the dissent. 73 Similarly, the Wyeth majority rejected
arguments that the presumption was inappropriate in contexts long regulated by the federal government (such as drug labeling), or in disputes
68. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
69. A similar lesson is offered by Altria, albeit much more tacitly. The Court's
conclusion that an industry guidance and some consent orders did not translate into a
potentially preemptive F7C policy encouraging use of the Cambridge Filter Method
suggests that an agency seeking to adopt a position on preemption will need to use more
formal procedures and to general effect. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 549-51
(2008); see also Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2717-18 (2009)
(emphasizing bizarre consequences of agency's view as factor counting against it).
70. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2067, 2069 ("[Tlhe searching
scrutiny in these decisions provides evidence that the Court is using administrative law
analysis to address federalism concerns . . . [and] the divide between ordinary and
extraordinary [administrative law] here is far from stark.").
71. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 153,
264-65 (2009) (noting Wyeth Court grounded its decision in "federalism-protecting
presumption against preemption").
72. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)); Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543 (quoting same).
73. See Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543; id. at 556-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting Court
had not expressly invoked presumption in such contexts of late).
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over implied conflict preemption.7 4 Wyeth also emphasized the need to
"respect . . . the States as 'independent sovereigns in our federal
system.' "75
Although it eschewed invocation of the presumption, 76 the Cuomo
majority gave perhaps even more extensive voice to federalism concerns.
Emphasizing "the incursion that the Comptroller's regulation makes
upon traditional state powers," the opinion noted that states had long
77
enforced both general and banking-specific laws against national banks.
It also characterized the OCC's "bizarre" interpretation of the NBAunder which states could apply but not enforce their laws against national
banks-as undermining the status of state enactments as law. 78 Equally
significant was the majority's identification of the NBA as a "mixed state/
federal regime[ ] in which the Federal Government exercises general
oversight while leaving state substantive law in place. '79 Perception of
Cuomo as motivated by federalism concerns is reinforced by the dissent,
which took pains to refute federalism-based arguments against
80
preemption.
But cracks exist in this federalism story. First, federalism concerns
are not leading the Court to dramatically transform its preemption analysis, even if they are affecting how that analysis is applied. Again, no member of the Court appears to question that common law duties constitute
state law requirements for preemption purposes. That view is not inevitable, given that tort suits impose liability-often for violation of general
duties-rather than specific limitations on conduct. The Court instead
could view state law requirements as ordinarily encompassing only specific obligations imposed by state statutes or regulations-an approach
seemingly more in line with the presumption against preemption, albeit
at odds with the Court's recent precedent. 8 1 Similarly, eightJustices continue to accept the legitimacy of implied obstacle preemption; only
Justice Thomas argued that inferring preemption absent a direct conflict
or express language to that effect was fundamentally at odds with federalism principles.8 2 The fact that Wyeth expressly left open the question of
how the Court would treat regulations with legal force is also significant,
as a refusal to defer to agencies in that context would mark a more radical change from its precedent-both preemption precedent and general
74. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3; see also id. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing
invocation of presumption was inappropriate).
75. Id. at 1195 n.3 (majority opinion) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996)).
76. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2720 (2009).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2718.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 2731-33 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing precedent on common law
duties as state law requirements).
82. See supra note 52 (discussing obstacle preemption).
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3
administrative law precedent-on how such regulations are reviewed .
Thus, to some degree federalism concerns appear to be coming in at the
margin.
Second, the idea that federalism is driving the decisions has difficulty
explaining why the Court is suddenly more sensitive to state interests.
That federal preemption can significantly restrict state authority in areas
of traditional state concern is hardly news. Nonetheless, as the Altria dissent noted, the Court has often failed to invoke the presumption against
preemption in construing express preemption clauses, as recently as the
preceding Term.8 4 Indeed, the 2007 decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank
appeared to apply a presumption in favor of preemption.8 5 The Court
has also upheld claims of preemption even when compliance with both
8 6
state and federal law was possible.

It is true that the issue of administrative preemption has gained
much more attention from the Court over the last few years, largely in
response to federal agencies' pro-preemption shift during the Bush
Administration and the resultant political and scholarly outcry.8 7 Tort
preemption has also increasingly risen to the fore, mainly as a result of
Cipollone, which held that common law duties could constitute state law
83. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2052, 2069, 2071-72 (discussing
Court's usual deference to substantive agency determinations, including those with
preemptive effect, and broad reading of congressional delegations of authority).
84. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 556 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases). A number of scholars have underscored the Court's inconsistency,
particularly with respect to invoking the presumption. See Dinh, supra note 22, at 2105-07
("IT]he Court's application of obstacle preemption belies the insistence on a general
presumption against preemption, of whatever weight."); Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption, supra note 26, at 506-10 (arguing presumption is inconsistently applied and
is outcome determinative when invoked); see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 290-92
(discussing failure of Court's presumption against preemption).
85. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007) (noting Court has
interpreted grants of power to national banks "not normally limited by, but rather
ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
86. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (finding
"conflict" when "federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter
fraud"); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 885 (2000) ("While we certainly
accept the dissent's basic position that a court should not find pre-emption too readily in
the absence of clear evidence of a conflict . . . we find such evidence here."); see also
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (noting presumption against preemption
"is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of
significant federal presence").
87. See McGarity, Preemption War, supra note 3, at 3-5 (discussing Bush
Administration's controversial use of preemption to further "tort reform" agenda);
Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 27, at 1550-51 (characterizing lobbyist "entreaties for
regulation" as attempts to "preempt additional state regulation and common law tort
liabilities"); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 3, at 227-28 (calling Bush
Administration preemption policy "'silent tort reform'" (quoting Stephen Labaton, "Silent
Tort Reform" Is Overriding States' Powers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5)); see also
infra text accompanying note 131 (noting increased attention to and critique of this
administrative trend in briefs).
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requirements for preemption purposes.8 8 Some of the Court's greater
sensitivity to federalism may thus reflect growing awareness of the significant impact of these preemption trends on the states. Apparent variation
in the Court's sensitivity to federalism also may reflect the Court's reading of different statutory regimes, 8 9 or idiosyncratic voting by particular
Justices. 90
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Court has not been consistently
solicitous of state interests in preemption cases, even of late, and even in
cases involving the same statute. A comparison of the Court's two recent
preemption decisions involving the NBA, Cuomo and Watters, demonstrates this point starkly. The concern with preserving the states' historic
role in enforcing state law against national banks emphasized in Cuomo
made no appearance in Watters, which instead underscored the burdens
put on national banks from having to comply with varied state regimes
and duplicative oversight. 9 1 Another notable contrast is between Altria
and Wyeth, on the one hand, and Riegel on the other. In Riegel, seven
members of the Court signed on to Justice Scalia's portrayal of state tort
law as little different from state regulation and, if anything, meriting less
protection given the limited expertise and perspective thatjurors bring to
bear. 92 Moreover, the state functions under attack in the three decisions-providing tort remedies for individuals injured by unlawful con-

88. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (plurality opinion); see
also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 441 (2005) ("It was only after
[Cipollone] . . . that a groundswell of federal and state decisions emerged holding that
[FIFRA's preemption provision] pre-empted claims like those advanced in this
litigation."); McGarity, Preemption War, supra note 3, at 60 (noting that, after
exceedingly influential" Cipollone decision, "federal preemption became the favored
defense for regulated companies seeking to avoid liability and accountability for harm
caused by their products and activities").
89. Preemption analysis is, after all, ultimately an exercise in statutory interpretation.
See, e.g., Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 548 (arguing that "relating to" language in preemption clause
is broader than "based on"); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 377-78
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stressing breadth of preemption language in statute).
90. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in rejecting preemption in Altria, 129 S.Ct. at
540-41, and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1190 (2009), but supported preemption in
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S.Ct. 2710, 2722 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), and in Watters, 550 U.S. at 4. Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion rejecting preemption in Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714, but supported preemption in
Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 551 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1217 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in Watters, 550 U.S. at 4, which
found preemption, but signed onto the majority opinion rejecting preemption in Cuomo,
129 S. Ct. at 2714. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion upholding preemption in
Geier, 529 U.S. at 864, but concurred in rejecting preemption in Wyeth, writing separately
to emphasize that the Court did not have before it the question of whether an agency
regulation with the force of law could preempt state tort law. 129 S.Ct. at 1204 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
91. Watters, 550 U.S. at 11.
92. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324-25 (2008).
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duct or enforcing state laws-have been at issue in other recent cases and
received a less protective response. 93
Third and perhaps most importantly, the results in these cases produced limited protection for states as active legislators and regulators,
with "active" here being the extent to which state officials are able to
develop and implement state policies on specific issues of concern. All
three decisions focused primarily on the ability to sue on state law claims
in state or federal court, rather than on the ability of states to take legislative or administrative action. Underlying this point is the recognition
that the "states" are not a single identifiable entity, but instead are comprised of a variety of institutions, officials, and functions. 9 4 The preemption decisions protected two state institutions, state courts and state common law, but offered only limited room for actions by the states'
95
politically elected leaders.
States play a particularly passive role in the types of damages actions
preserved in Altria and Wyeth, given that decisions to sue and decisions
about liability are made by private individuals, whether as plaintiffs or as
members of the jury. The only state official clearly involved is a state
judge, and then only if the action is brought in state court. True, states
can play a more active role by enacting statutes to address particular
harms, rather than simply relying upon traditional judicially developed
common law rules. Indeed, the damages action in Altria arose under
such a state statute. 9 6 Of greater significance perhaps, the state statute at
issue in Altria expressly provides for enforcement by the state attorney
general as well as by private damages actions, and thus the decision could
be said to also protect some enforcement role for state officials.9 7 On the
other hand, Altria offers a strong caution against states playing too much
of a regulatory role, with the majority concluding that the state law at
issue was not preempted precisely because it embodied a general duty not
93. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324-25 (finding state tort remedies preempted);
Watters, 550 U.S. at 7 (preempting state enforcement of state licensing and oversight of
state-chartered subsidiaries of national banks).
94. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1201, 1201
(1999) ("In discussions about American federalism, it is common to speak of a 'state
government' as if it were a black box, an individual speaking with a single voice ....
[A]
,state' actually incorporates a bundle of different subdivisions, branches, and
agencies . . ").
95. Nor is it at all clear which state actor best represents the interests served by state
common law. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 67, at 2157 ("There is no
a priori representative of state interests served by the common law. .. ").
96. See Maine Unfair Trade Protection Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (Supp.
2009).
97. See id. § 209 (2002 & Supp. 2009) (giving attorney general enforcement power);
id. § 211 (giving attorney general investigatory power). The Vermont Attorney General
recently won ajudgment against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. under an analogous Vermont
consumer fraud statute and the tobacco master settlement agreement. See David
Kesmodel, Cigarette Maker Loses Vermont Marketing Suit, Wall St.J., Mar. 12, 2010, at B4.
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to deceive and was not aimed at smoking or health. 98 Efforts by the attorney general to use the statute to address smoking-related harms thus
might well be viewed more skeptically; indeed, the Court previously invalidated a similar attempt in this vein by the Massachusetts Attorney
General. 99
Wyeth, meanwhile, involved a traditional common law failure-to-warn
claim. Thus, even the background state legislative involvement found in
Altria was lacking. Moreover, the Wyeth majority justified its rejection of
preemption in terms quite specific to common law suits. For example, it
emphasized the compensatory functions and beneficial incentives associated with tort suits and concluded specifically "that Congress did not regard state tort litigation as an obstacle to achieving its purposes."10 0 As a
result, Wyeth's resistance toward preemption may well not extend to contexts involving more active and targeted state regulation, where the Court
might perceive greater potential for conflict between federal and state
requirements.
State officials were much more actively involved in Cuomo, which upheld a state attorney general's ability to sue to enforce state law. Equally
important, Cuomo rejected the OCC's effort to restrict state enforcement
to general state laws, emphasizing that Congress chose not to exempt national banks from state banking laws. 10 1 Cuomo thus affirms targeted state
regulation of banking and more active state governance in this area.
Strikingly, however, Cuomo denied state officials access to their traditional
administrative enforcement authority, insisting that a state's enforcement
of its banking laws against national banks could only occur in connection
with a court proceeding.10 2 The net result is that, as a formal matter,
state officials are denied the ability to exercise "any form of administrative oversight" over national banks, including the ability to issue administrative subpoenas targeted to identifying potential violations of state
law. 10 3 The majority justified this prohibition on administrative enforcement as mandated by the NBA's general bar on state exercise of "visitorial
98. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 545-46 (2008).
99. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 548-51 (2001) (holding
preempted state regulations addressing sale and advertising of cigarettes promulgated by
Massachusetts Attorney General under state unfair and deceptive trade practices statute);
see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (reading language "a law or
regulation" in express preemption clause as "impl[ying] a discreteness-which is

embodied in statutes and regulations-that is not present in the common law");
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1996) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing
between specific and general duties and holding only specific duties were preempted
under statute at issue).
100. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1199-200, 1202 (2009).
101. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2718 (2009).
102. Id. at 2718, 2721-22.
103. Id. at 2721. In practice, "formally" may prove an important caveat, as banks may
well prefer to voluntarily provide information sought by state officials as a means of
forestalling suit.
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powers ... except as ...vested in the courts of justice."10 4 Yet this conclusion seems contradicted by the majority's own insistence that "a sovereign's 'visitorial powers' and its power to enforce the law are two different
things."'10 5 Nor, moreover, would allowing administrative enforcement of
state law necessarily lead to the unconstrained discretion associated with
visitorial powers, particularly if the limits on such administrative oversight
10 6
were outlined by the Court.
In short, these decisions appear to assign the states a somewhat narrow and passive role, perhaps excessively so. To be sure, federalism can
mean many things, and preserving state law's traditional remedial function or state law enforcement in the courts certainly represents one account.10 7 But federalism is often understood as embracing more than
this, in particular as protecting the ability of states to set policy and actively govern through their elected officials.1 08 Indeed, providing room
for such active governance is critical if federalism is to achieve its purported benefits in our constitutional system. As Ernest Young observes:
" [V] irtually all the values that federalism is supposed to promote-such
as regulatory diversity, political participation, and restraints on tyrannyturn on the capacity of the states to exercise self-government."1 0 9 The
104. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
105. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing
House: The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a
Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, in The Panic of
2008: Causes, Consequences and Implications for Reform (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 6-12) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Supreme
Court Responds], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1499216 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Cuomo and definition of
"visitorial powers" extensively).
106. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2719, 2721 ("Judges are trusted to prevent 'fishing
expeditions' or an undirected rummaging through bank books and records for evidence
of some unknown wrongdoing.").
107. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 & n.3 (2009) (noting "state-law
causes of action" by which to deter harmful conduct and provide injured individuals with
compensation are an exercise of "historic police powers of the States" and represent "a
field which the States have traditionally occupied" (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity & Tragic
Compromise 12, 26-27 (2008) (defining federalism as entailing grant of partial autonomy
to geographic subdivisions and identifying federalism's insistence on "allow[ing]
geographic subunits to choose divergent goals" as weakness of federalism compared to
decentralization); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 222 (2000) ("[Flederalism is meant to preserve the
regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy choices.").
109. Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 3, at 4. Margaret Lemos has argued that this
focus on state exercise of independent regulatory authority unduly ignores the federalism
potential attendant simply on enforcement of federal law by state attorneys general. See
Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 4, 24-28) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Lemos's criticism is
apt and she rightly identifies such state enforcement as providing an opportunity for states
to play a governance role. But she does not dispute the importance of state regulation to
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Court itself has identified the states' ability to legislate and execute the
law independently of federal direction as central to the constitutional federalist structure, but it has rejected such autonomy for the state courts. 1 10
That the preemption decisions offer at best limited protection for state
self-governance through state political branches thus reinforces doubts
that federalism is the driving force underlying the decisions.
C. An Alternative Explanation: Agency Failure
Invocation of federalism in the preemption context is hardly surprising. More unusual is another analytic theme that surfaces repeatedly in
the decisions: the Court's concern that federal agencies may be systematically failing to meet their statutory responsibilities. An examination of
the decisions suggests that such fear of federal agency failure, and the
role of state law and state enforcement in improving federal regulatory
performance, is central to the reasoning and results in these decisions. 1 I
This concern with reforming and improving federal administrative performance is reinforced by the decisions' emphasis on the regulatory role
of tort law over its compensatory function.
1. Agency Failure's Centrality. - Although present in all three decisions, concern about the potential for agency failure is particularly prominent in Wyeth. The majority there emphasized the resource constraints
under which the FDA labors, noting that "[t]he FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market, and manufacturers
have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the
postmarketing phase as new risks emerge."1 12 Equally important, the
opinion portrays state law liability as critical to encouraging information
disclosure that is essential for FDA oversight: "State tort suits uncover
unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers to
disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory
function that may motivate injured persons to come forward with inforfederalism, and indeed suggests that state enforcement may be particularly relevant where
states also enjoy some regulatory authority. See id. (manuscript at 34, 36). In any event, as
noted above, a striking feature of the preemption decisions is the limited role played by
state officials even in the enforcement arena. See supra text accompanying notes 96-106.
110. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907, 924-30 (1997) (rejecting
federal commandeering of state executive officials and distinguishing requirement that
state courts must enforce federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)
(rejecting federal commandeering of state legislatures); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394
(1947) (holding state court cannot refuse to enforce federal rights of action, at least if it
hears analogous state law claims).
111. In structuring preemption analysis to improve federal agency performance, the
Court has adopted a position in line with several tort scholars, who have argued in
particular for improved information disclosure on risks as a necessary price of federal
administrative preemption. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 28, at 7; Sharkey, Products
Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 513-20; see also Schuck, supra note 28, at 83
(favoring enhanced "manufacturers' incentives to gather, analyze, and disclose all relevant
risk information to the FDA, Congress, and the public in a timely fashion").
112. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (footnote omitted).
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mation." 113 The majority offered this account to explain why the FDA
had "traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of drug
regulation" and thus its switch to viewing FDA regulation as exclusive represented "a dramatic change in position." 1 4 But the Court was equally
concerned to demonstrate that the FDA's new view was unreasonable. To
that end, the majority included a lengthy footnote in which it quoted
from several reports arguing that the FDA lacked the resources and staff
115
to adequately protect consumers on its own.
The Wyeth majority thus invoked two separate instances of FDA failure. The first was the agency's general inability to provide adequate
postapproval monitoring of drugs and act against potential hazards. The
second was the agency's failure to appreciate its own limitations, combined with its adoption of a counterproductive new stance supporting
preemption withoutjustifying its change in view. The first form of agency
failure was more overtly identified in the majority opinion, yet the second
was likely as much of a driving force. What the second failure revealed
was an unreliable and potentially captured agency, whose rules and understanding of its own actions were not grounded in agency expertise and
therefore did not merit deference. In fact, some members of the Court
may have perceived a third, more specific agency failure at issue in the
case, namely the FDA's failure to prohibit IV-push administration of
Phenergan. The majority opinion did not criticize the FDA on this front,
but Justices Alito and Ginsburg both questioned the FDA's decision at
116
oral argument.
Similar concerns with agency performance are evident to some degree in Altria. Altria also made reference to a resource-strapped agency
unable to fulfill its responsibilities without state assistance: "The FTC has
long depended on cooperative state regulation to achieve its mission because, although one of the smallest administrative agencies, it is charged
with policing an enormous amount of activity." 117 The majority also characterized the FTC's stance as one of "inaction" and "agency nonenforcement of a federal statute" in allowing continued use of the Cambridge
1113. Id.
114. Id. at 1202-03.
115. Id. at 1202 n.l. A law review article cited by the Wyeth Court argues that the
FDA's view was based on "an unrealistic assessment of the agency's practical ability-once
it has approved the marketing of a drug-to detect unforeseen adverse effects of the drug
and to take prompt and effective remedial action." David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A
Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 Geo. L.J.
461, 465 (2008); see also Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202-03 & n.12 (citing Kessler & Vladeck).
116. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249)
(Alito, J.) ("[H]ow could the FDA [have] concluded that IV push was safe and effective
when on the benefit side of this you don't have a life-saving drug, you have a drug that
relieves nausea, and on the risk side you have a risk of gangrene?"); id. at 7 (Ginsburg, J.)
("[T] he risk of gangrene and amputation is there. No matter what benefit there was, how
could the benefit outweigh that substantial risk?").
117. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S.Ct. 538, 545 n.6 (2008).
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Filter Method. 1 18 This characterization was more generous to the FTC
than describing it as affirmatively allowing reliance on a faulty test
method, and the Court also emphasized that the FTC's inaction resulted
in part from the fact that tobacco companies did not provide test results
demonstrating the Filter Method's inadequacies.' 1 9 The Court further
noted that the FTC itself "disavowe [d] any policy authorizing the use of
'light' or 'low tar' descriptors," and the agency's occasional efforts to "police cigarette companies' misleading results of test results." 120 Thus, the
treatment of the FTC is more positive than that which the FDA received
in Wyeth-perhaps in part due to the fact that the FTC, unlike the FDA,
opposed preemption. 12 1 Nonetheless, Altria is similar to Wyeth in portraying the F-fC as unable to fulfill its statutory mandate and as having been
inactive in the face of potential risks.
Federal agency failure loomed particularly large in the background
of Cuomo, with the OCC repeatedly characterized as an agency captured
by the entities it was charged with regulating, the classic example of
agency failure. 122 Interestingly, the Court did not invoke these allegations or in other ways expressly criticize the agency's overall performance
as it did in Wyeth. Moreover, the Court insisted that its decision in no way
called into question its decision two years earlier in Watters, in which the
Court had ruled in favor of preemption, notwithstanding strong allega23
tions of OCC failure.'
118. Id. at 550-51.
119. Id. at 551 n.14 (arguing "FTC's inaction . . . [was] in part the result of
petitioners' failure to disclose" evidence of testing inaccuracy).
120. Id. at 549-50.
121. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14-16,
Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) (arguing Respondents' claims not preempted by FTC
regulations); see also Sharkey, Product Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 471-77
(emphasizing importance of agency's position on preemption in understanding results in
preemption cases).
122. See, e.g., Brief for the States of North Carolina et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 33-39, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S.Ct. 2710 (2009) (No. 08453) (arguing "[t] he OCC's self-interest in protecting its constituent banks... apparently
is driving the OCC's position on visitorial powers"); id. at 37 ("The OCC has a 'strong
incentive' to persuade major banks to retain or convert to national charters because the
OCC's budget is almost entirely funded by fees paid by national banks." (quoting Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a
Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 Ann. Rev.
Banking & Fin. L. 225, 276 (2004))); Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note 105,
at 19-25 ("In response to the OCC's preemption campaign, several large, multistate banks
converted from state to national charters, thereby producing a significant increase in the
OCC's assessment revenues."); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1050-52 (1997) [hereinafter Merrill,
Capture Theory] (describing theory of agency capture and its centrality as "pathology of
agency government").
123. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717 (distinguishing Watters); see also Brief Amici Curiae
of AARP et al. in Support of Petitioner, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007)
(No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570989, at *11-*14 (identifying OCC's regulatory failures and
self-interest in preempting state regulation). The holding in Watters was subsequently
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Nonetheless, Cuomo still contains its share of allusions to deficient
federal regulation. The majority insisted that preemption of state law enforcement would render state law de facto ineffectual, arguing that "[t] he
bark remains, but the bite does not.1 24 Implicit in this characterization
is a rejection of the possibility that the OCC could be relied upon to
enforce state law where applicable.' 25 The majority also repeatedly cast
the OCC as overreaching and "attempt[ing] to do what Congress declined to do: Exempt national banks from all state banking laws, or at
least state enforcement of those laws."' 26 On this framing, the OCC appears as an agency that has fundamentally misunderstood the regulatory
regime it is charged with enforcing and that has sought, by administrative
fiat, to exempt national banks from longstanding legal constraints.
Cuomo's portrayal is also interesting because it implicitly recognizes that
federal overregulation can be a form of federal agency failure-albeit in
this case, the federal overregulation was aimed at limiting the regulatory
oversight applied to national banks. Although Cuomo does not explicitly
tie preservation of state enforcement to improved OCC regulation, its
characterization of federal banking regulation as involving a "mixed
state/federal regime[ ]," as in Wyeth, similarly underscores the importance of state enforcement to effective implementation of the overall federal regulatory scheme. 12 7 Preserving room for state enforcement thus
ensured that the OCC would not be able to undermine the fundamental
congressional choice of a dual national-state bank regulatory system.
This consistent theme of agency failures-be they failures of funding, performance, or reasoning-is notable. It marks a striking departure
from previous preemption precedent, which at times portrayed agencies
as carefully wielding their expertise to achieve the appropriate balance
between state and federal regulation. 128 Even before the Court's most
statutorily overruled by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1044(a), 1046, 124 Stat. 1376, 2014-15, 2017-18 (2010) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1465, 5136C(b)) (providing that application of state law to
national bank subsidiary or affiliate is not preempted).
124. Cuomo, 129 S.Ct. at 2718.
125. See id. at 2718 n.3 (leaving open question of "whether converting the
Comptroller's visitorial power to assure compliance with all applicable laws . . . into an
obligation to ensure compliance with certain state laws," as Congress did in Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, sufficed to preempt state
enforcement of state law).
126. Id. at 2720; see also id. at 2715 (characterizing OCC regulation as "expansive");
id. at 2717 (stating "[t]here is not a credible argument" supporting equation of visitorial
powers and law enforcement, as OCC's regulation does).
127. Id. at 2718, 2720-21.
128. See, e.g,, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317-18 (2008) (characterizing
FDA's premarket approval process as "rigorous" and documenting extensive data collected
and time spent by FDA); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 863, 883 (2000)
("The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulations and its
objectives .... "); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 110 (2000) ("[E]ven in the context
of a regulation related to local waters, a federal official with an overview of all possible
ramifications of a particular requirement might be in the best position to balance all the
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recent decisions, however, occasional suggestions of greater judicial skepticism of agencies had appeared in preemption decisions. The Court's
sharply contested 2006 decision in Gonzales v. Oregon is a prime example;
there, the majority refused to defer to the Attorney General's interpretation of his own regulation, citing among other factors his lack of exper1 29
Such
tise and his failure to consult outside of his own department.
growing skepticism may have several roots, but an important likely contributing factor is the federal agencies' dramatic shift to advocating for
130
This phenomebroad preemption during the Bush Administration.
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132
allegawere
Also in the larger background
Wyeth, Cuomo, and Gonzales.
tions of high-profile regulatory failures, such as the FDA's delay in acting
on Vioxx and other popular drugs found to pose unexpected postapproval risks, or the failure of financial regulators (including the OCC)

competing interests."); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) ("[T]he agency is
uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress .... "
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
129. 546 U.S. 243, 268-69, 274-75 (2006); see also id. at 257 ("An agency does not
acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and
experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory
language."). Additionally, in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007), the
majority avoided discussing the agency's view and any deference due it altogether, opting
instead to engage in a fairly expansive reading of statutory text to find preemption plainly
required. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2042-45 (describing and
critiquing reasoning in Watters); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328-29 (critiquing agency's
reasoning in interpreting its own regulations with respect to preemption as "less than
compelling").
130. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing pro-preemption shift and
resulting scholarly outcry).
131. See, e.g., Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2032-35 (discussing
Attorney General Ashcroft's implementation of Controlled Substances Act); Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble, supra note 3, at 237-42 (discussing FDA); Wilmarth, Supreme
Court Responds, supra note 105, at 19-21, 24 (discussing OCC).
132. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) ("EPA has offered no
reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or
contribute to climate change."); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA:
From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 85 ("There is [in Massachusetts] a
conclusory assertion that EPA's nonscientific 'policy judgments' do not 'amount to a
reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment' . . . ." (quoting
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533-34)); Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2059
("Massachusetts... repeatedly criticized the EPA .. ").
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to act on subprime mortgage abuses by national banks. 13 3 The mortgage
crisis is particularly relevant because that represented a context in which
state attorneys general and other state officials were far more active than
federal regulators in policing fraud, prompting efforts by the OCC to re13 4
strict state intervention.
Focusing on agency failure also helps explain why federalism surfaces to the extent it does in the decisions. The decisions identify state
law as a mechanism to guard against federal agency failure, and federalism presumptions represent an important analytical tool for ensuring
that state law is preserved. Critically, however, federalism is invoked more
as a means to improve federal agency performance than as a value in its
own right.'3 5 Put differently, federalism here means preserving state authority because of its benefits for national administration, not because of
constitutional recognition of states as quasi-independent sovereigns or
general systemic gains from having states serve as laboratories of experiment. Interestingly, this account of state law as a tool for policing and
improving federal administration also explains why the decisions might
preserve only a relatively limited state enforcement role. Robust authority to construct and pursue independent policies is less important when
states are functioning as federal regulatory adjuncts rather than as more
autonomous sovereigns. Indeed, more directed and active state regulation could complicate the tasks facing federal agencies by expanding the
occasions of federal-state conflict.
Other scholars similarly have emphasized the extent to which poor
federal administrative performance led the Court to resist preemption in
these decisions. Arthur Wilmarth, for example, argues that Cuomo's rejection of preemption is best explained by the subprime mortgage crisis and
the Court's concern "that the OCC's preemption rules and regulatory

133. See Kessler & Viadeck, supra note 115, at 480 ("[T]he FDA acknowledges that it
took over a year to force Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, to add a warning of the risks of
heart attack and stroke to Vioxx's label."); Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M.
Wachter, Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and
Regulatory Failure, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1327, 1351-56 (2009) (discussing regulatory lapses by
OCC and Office of Thrift Supervision in relation to subprime mortgage crisis); Nagareda,
supra note 28, at 43 (noting "widespread criticism of the FDA in connection with the
controversy over the safety of prescription pain drugs," including Vioxx).
134. See Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note 105, at 3, 19-21, 26
(arguing that states took greater efforts to address predatory lending and faulting federal
regulatory oversight).
135. As a result, the preemption decisions represent a twist on the relationship
between federalism and administrative law, evident in other recent precedent. As I have
discussed elsewhere, of late the Court has increasingly used administrative law to protect
state interests against undue federal intrusion. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note
27, at 2063-69; supra note 70 and accompanying text. The preemption decisions similarly
present a close intermingling of administrative law and federalism concerns, but the
underlying dynamic between these two is reversed: Here federalism is serving more to
meet administrative law concerns than the other way round.
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failings contributed to the severity" of that crisis. 13 6 David Vladeck has
long contended that the FDA's regulatory failures, particularly in postapproval monitoring of drugs and medical devices, strongly counseled
against preemption of failure-to-warn suits. 1 3 7 On these accounts, state
law helps avoid the regulatory gaps and uncompensated harms that poor
federal regulation otherwise could create. 138 In addition, Catherine
Sharkey has noted the reforming effect that Wyeth may have on agency
preemption determinations, encouraging agencies to use notice-andcomment rulemaking and create a sufficient agency record in support. 139
Less highlighted has been the extent to which the decisions portray state
law as playing an important role in reforming and improving federal regulation more broadly. Writing before the recent decisions, however,
Richard Nagareda and others emphasized the potential of using preemption to improve regulation by fostering greater information disclosure to
the FDA.1 4 0 In like vein, David Barron has argued limited preemption
helps protect against excessive federal agency politicization,14 1 and Amy
Widman has defended state enforcement of federal regulations as a
14 2
check on federal enforcement inaction.
2. Dominance of "Tort as Regulation" over "Tort as Compensation."Agency failure's centrality to the Court's reasoning is also demonstrated
136. Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note 105, at 2, 31.
137. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 115, at 484-95 (emphasizing resource and
information constraints on FDA); see also David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory
Failure Risks, in Preemption Choice, supra note 3, at 56-58 (identifying capture,
information deficiencies, and limited resources as problems causing federal regulatory
failure more generally).
138. See Vladeck, supra note 137, at 56 (describing "safety net of tort litigation" to fill
gaps that regulatory agencies cannot fill"); Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra
note 105, at 3 (calling states "far more proactive" than federal agencies in protecting
consumers).
139. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 67, at 2179-80, 2186-89.
140. See Nagareda, supra note 28, at 40-49; see also Kessler & Vladeck, supra note
115, at 491-95 (noting, in course of discussing failure-to-warn litigation's effectiveness in
producing information of product risk, instances in which FDA responded to such
information disclosures); Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 519-20
(emphasizing greater information disclosure to FDA as benefit of limiting preemption to
instances in which FDA has made determination on precise risk at issue). But see Schuck,
supra note 28, at 99-100 (questioning information gains to FDA from litigation).
141. See David J. Barron, Foreword: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming
Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095,
1097-98 (2008) ("[D]ecentralization is most definitely responsive to the concerns raised by
politicization . .

").

142. See Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law
Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers-A Case Study of the Consumer
Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 4-6, 31-37) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (portraying state
enforcement as central to ensuring protection of state interests in federal administration
and identifying such an approach as in keeping with federalism concerns of Cuomo); see
also Lemos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 13-32) (discussing, from federalism
perspective, benefits of such state enforcement).
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by the decisions' treatment of individual compensation. Concern with
preserving injured individuals' access to compensation has featured
prominently in many of the Court's prior decisions rejecting tort preemption claims. 143 Yet this consideration was lacking in the recent preemption decisions; compensation concerns were expressly identified only in
Wyeth and invoked there somewhat obliquely. 144 Even more striking is
the extent to which Wyeth portrayed individual compensation less as a
goal in its own right and more as simply a mechanism that can assist federal regulators by encouraging disclosure. According to the Court,
"[s] tate tort suits . . .serve a distinct compensatory function that may
motivate injured persons to come forward with information." 145 This suggests that the Court perceives state tort liability as helping federal regulators identify where to target their regulatory efforts, thereby ensuring that
potential hazards do not escape federal regulatory scrutiny. More generally, the decisions portray tort liability primarily in regulatory terms. This
is again most evident in Wyeth, which repeatedly invoked the incentive
effects of tort liability, such as its statement that Congress "may... have
recognized that state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give ade14 6
quate warnings."
Such a regulatory account of tort law had surfaced previously in the
Court's preemption decisions, 14 7 but it usually did so in decisions finding
preemption. 148 The dominance of the regulatory tort model here, not143. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 466-71 (discussing
Court's treatment of tort law as compensatory in preemption decisions).
144. The Court noted that "Congress did not provide a federal remedy for consumers
harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs" in the original FDCA or subsequent amendments,
from which the Court inferred Congress had "determined that widely available state rights
of action provided appropriate relief for injured consumers." Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187, 1199 (2009). Underlying this conclusion was the assumption that Congress would
not have left injured consumers without some avenue of relief. On other occasions,
however, the Court has made this point expressly, stating, "[i]f Congress had intended to
deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would have
expressed that intent more clearly." Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449
(2005); accord Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (finding
implausible that "Congress would, without comment, remove all means ofjudicial recourse
for those injured by illegal conduct"). But see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326
(2008) (finding congressional intent to deny judicial recourse obvious because "this is
exactly what a pre-emption clause for medical devices does by its terms").
145. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
146. Id. at 1199-200; see also id. at 1202 ("State tort suits ... provide incentives for
drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.").
147. This regulatory view of tort law was particularly evident in Riegel's statement that
"[s]tate tort law that requires a manufacturer's catheters to be safer, but hence less
effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than
[a] state regulatory law to the same effect." Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325.
148. Catherine Sharkey has made this point particularly well, identifying two distinct
understandings of tort law in the Court's tort preemption precedent-one emphasizing
the regulatory role of tort and the other its corrective justice or compensatory functionand noting the correlation of the latter with decisions rejecting preemption claims. See
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withstanding the failure of claims for preemption, underscores the extent
to which improving federal regulation and federal agency performance
lie at the decisions' analytic core. Interestingly, Wyeth left unstated a
seemingly more direct and obvious connection between agency failure
and individual compensation: the point that poor agency performance
increases the likelihood of injured individuals and thus intensifies the importance of state tort law's compensatory function. One reason the
Court may not have drawn this linkage is because doing so might seem to
call into question specific agency regulatory decisions, such as the FDA's
decision to allow IV injection of Phenergan. But that this connection
went unmentioned again reinforces the strongly regulatory rather than
compensatory view of tort law evident in the majority opinion.
Additional evidence that improving regulatory outcomes is the decisions' prime concern comes from the Court's failure to emphasize the
intersection between securing individual compensation and respecting
federalism principles. One of the most problematic aspects of administrative preemption of tort law is that the agencies themselves lack the
ability to create alternative compensatory mechanisms.1 49 Any public insurance fund, such as the programs used to assist 9/11 and vaccine victims, must be created by Congress.15 0 Agencies also lack the ability to
provide for private rights of action not authorized by Congress in a governing statute.15 1 From an individual compensation perspective, therefore, an important reason to require that preemption decisions be made
by Congress is that doing so may increase the chances that preemption
will be tied to some alternative means for securing compensation. 5 2 Requiring congressional action is also-and more commonly-justified on
Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 459. These two alternative views
in preemption precedent parallel two alternative theories of the function tort law plays in
the academic literature: regulatory accounts and tort as corrective justice. See, e.g.,
Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 1501, 1508-09 (2009) (identifying scholars falling into both "camps"); Gary T.
Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice,
75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801, 1801, 1802-11 (1997) (describing "two major camps" as those who
"understand[ ] tort liability as an instrument aimed largely at the goal of deterrence" and
those who "look[ ] at tort law as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties").
149. See Schuck, supra note 28, at 93, 100-01 & n.114 ("The principal structural
limitation of FDA regulation, [for example], is that it cannot directly compensate
victims ....").
150. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . ."); see also September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (creating
public insurance fund); National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99660, § 2110, 100 Stat. 3755, 3758 (same).
151. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("Like substantive federal law
itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.").
152. See McGarity, Preemption War, supra note 3, at 47 ("Until quite recently ...
Congress never expressly preempted state common law without providing an alternative
route to corrective justice by creating either a separate federal cause of action or an
alternative administrative compensation regime."); Klass, supra note 148, at 1537-40
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federalism grounds, as mandated by our federalist constitutional structure. 153 As a result, the individual compensation and structural federalism perspectives dovetail in seeking clear congressional authorization of
preemption. Federalism and individual compensation would seem
closely interwoven in Wyeth and Altria in any event, given that the traditional state function at issue in both is precisely that of preserving injured
individuals' access to compensation.15 4 Yet the Court made little of these
connections between preserving individual compensation and federalism,
focusing instead on the ways that individual compensation and state liability each separately serve to improve federal regulation.
II.

CONFLICTING JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO ALLEGED AGENCY FAILURE

On this account, the preemption decisions are significantly about
federal administration. They represent an effort by the Court to harness
the power of state law and judicial preemption analysis to police and improve federal agency performance. Federalism and individual compensation concerns are also present, to be sure, but what is really driving the
analysis is fear of agency failure.
Viewed in this light, however, the decisions appear in some tension
with at least some of the Court's preemption and administrative law precedent. The Court has previously rejected state efforts to tie tort liability
to the quality of federal administrative decisionmaking. It has also consistently resisted-including in a decision issued just one day before
Wyeth-efforts to use the courts to address claims of general agency failure. The discussion below begins by describing the Court's precedent
holding state law claims alleging fraud on a federal agency preempted,
and next describes the Court's rejection of legal challenges targeting
broad agency policy or performance. It then attempts to explain this divergence between the preemption decisions and other precedent addressing claims of agency failure. Because the Court itself never acknowledges this divergence, efforts to make sense of it are a hazardous
(noting shift in 1990s whereby Congress was not providing "a federal substitute when it
decide[d] to eliminate state tort lawsuits").

153. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111, 2116 (2008)
("[C]onstitutionalism means that we are simply not free to choose whatever normative
principles and institutional strategies we think best."); Bhagwat, supra note 26, at 225-26,
228-29 ("[E]fficiency is beside the point. The Constitution preserves state authority even
); Clark, supra note 22, at 1427-30 ("The Supreme Court's longwhen it is inefficient ....
standing presumption against preemption ... functions to ensure that Congress... makes
the crucial decision to displace state law" and such decisions "ensure[ ] that only actors
subject to the political safeguards of federalism adopt 'the supreme Law of the Land.'").
154. For an argument that preserving tort remedies is particularly important from a
federalism perspective, see Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and
Preemption of State Remedies in Collective Action Perspective, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, 8, 19, 26), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=robert-glicksman (on file with the Columbia Law
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enterprise. One factor that appears particularly salient, however, is that,
in the preemption decisions, state law and preemption analysis target federal administration indirectly rather than directly.
A. Buckman and Fraud-on-the-Agency Claims
Concerns about federal agency failure are not new to the preemption context. But in the past, the Court has shown far less receptivity to
the idea of using state law to improve federal agency performance. The
2001 case of Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee involved claims that
a manufacturer of orthopedic bone screws had made fraudulent representations to the FDA to obtain FDA approval for the devices.1 55 The
claims were brought as state law actions for fraud against the consulting
company that had helped the manufacturer obtain FDA approval. The
Court ruled such "fraud-on-the-FDA" claims were impliedly preempted,
stating:
[T]he federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to
punish and deter fraud against the Administration, and.., this
authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat
delicate balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by
the Administration can be skewed
by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA
1 56
claims under state tort law.
According to the Court, the possibility of fraud-on-the-FDA liability
might discourage manufacturers from seeking FDA approval for products
or lead them "to submit a deluge of information that the Administration
neither wants nor needs."'1 57 Seven Justices held that, as a result,
"[s]tate-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with . . . the
Administration's judgment and objectives" and were categorically preempted.' 5 8 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that preemption was appropriate here but rejected
the majority's categorical ban. In his view, "[i]f the FDA determines both
that fraud has occurred and that such fraud requires the removal of a
product from the market, state damages remedies would not encroach
upon, but rather would . . . facilitate, the federal enforcement
59
scheme."
Three features of Buckman stand in particular contrast to Wyeth. First
is the impressive consensus among the Justices; whereas Wyeth was closely
contested, Buckman was unanimous in concluding that preemption was
155. 531 U.S. 341, 343 (2001).
156. Id. at 348. For a discussion of the Court's greater willingness to allow fraud-onthe-agency claims in the patent context, see Louis M. Bograd & Andre M. Mura, Buckman
Stops Here! Limits on Preemption of State Tort Claims Involving Allegations of Fraud on
the PTO or the FDA, 41 Rutgers L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 36-43), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1532841 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
157. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350-51.
158. Id. at 350-53.
159. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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warranted. Second is Buckman's portrayal of the FDA. Rather than
Wyeth's underresourced agency unable to obtain the information it needs
to monitor the multitude of drugs and devices on the market, Buckman
viewed the FDA as a sophisticated and expert regulator that carefully balances conflicting goals and structures its processes to obtain the optimal
amount of information. 160 Third, and most relevant to my purposes
here, is Buckman's resistance to state law playing a role in federal administration. Buckman described the relationship between a federal agency
and the entity it regulates as "inherently federal in character" and insisted
that the state fraud claims at issue arose "solely from the violation of
FDCA requirements." 61 This perception of federal administration and
state law as inherently distinct is a basic assumption driving the Court's
analysis. It underlies Buckman's rejection of a presumption against preemption, because "[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 'a
field which the States have traditionally occupied."1 62 It also explains
the disagreement between the majority and the concurrence; whereas the
concurrence was willing to countenance state law fraud enforcement conditioned on an FDA determination that fraud had occurred, the majority
was unwilling to allow states even that role. Instead, in the Buckman majority's portrayal, state fraud-on-the-FDA claims represented an illegitimate state effort to interfere in a purely federal realm-the enforcement
of federal law by the federal agency to which Congress had delegated
enforcement responsibility.
Buckman's insistence that the fraud claims involved there depended
exclusively on federal law, as opposed to "traditional state tort law which
had predated the federal enactments in questions [sic],"1 63 left open the
question whether any state tort law referencing a manufacturer's fraudulent actions vis-t-vis the FDA would be preempted, or only state actions
that sought to impose liability for such fraud. This question arose in
Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 164 a Second Circuit decision addressing a
Michigan statute that granted immunity from product liability actions for
drugs approved by the FDA and in compliance with FDA requirements
but denied such immunity when the drug's manufacturer withheld or
misrepresented required information and the FDA would not have ap16 5
proved the drug had it possessed complete and accurate information.
The Second Circuit held that Michigan's immunity exception was not
preempted under Buckman because claims allowed as a result of the exception were "premised on traditional duties between a product manufacturer and Michigan consumers" and therefore not "based solely on the
160. Id. at 350-51 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at 347, 352-53.
162. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
163. Id. at 353.
164. 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006).
165. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000).
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wrong of defrauding the FDA."1 66 The Sixth Circuit meanwhile took a
different view of Michigan's statute, concluding that the immunity exception was impliedly preempted under Buckman to the extent its application
was based on a state court finding of fraud on the FDA, rather than a
167
finding of fraud by the FDA itself.
The Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, but in the end
simply affirmed the Second Circuit by an evenly divided vote, with Chief
Justice Roberts recused. 168 The much closer vote than in Buckman is notable, though it is impossible to tell whether that stemmed from the different claims in the two cases or instead reflected some Justices' changing
views on Buckman. 169 The contrasts between Buckman and Wyeth suggest
that to some extent such change may be occurring. Significantly, however, the failure-to-warn claims in Wyeth did not take issue with the FDA's
approval of Phenergan, 1 70 and thus Wyeth does not necessarily signal that
the Court has changed its view on state tort claims based on allegations of
fraud against federal agencies.
B. Administrative Law Challenges to Agency Failure
Wyeth's emphasis on how state liability can improve the FDA's performance is also at odds with administrative law precedent rejecting efforts to challenge general agency functioning. These cases are based exclusively in federal law, such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
or substantive federal statutes, and they involve claims that an agency is
pursuing policies or programmatic approaches at odds with governing
166. Desiano, 467 F.3d at 94-96; see also id. at 94 (arguing presumption against
preemption applied here because, unlike Buckman, Michigan was not "attempt[ing] to
police fraud against the FDA" but instead simply "to regulate and restrict when victims
could continue to recover under preexisting state products liability law").
167. Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004); see also
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 841,
850-55 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Fraud Caveat] (discussing Desiano, Garcia, and related
precedent and arguing for Garcia approach). For other views on Desiano and Garcia,
compare Nagareda, supra note 28, at 46-47 (supporting Desiano approach), with Richard
A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference
and a Response to Richard Nagareda, J. Tort L., Dec. 2006, at 13-14 (criticizing Desiano).
168. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (mem.) (per curiam).
169. Lower courts' continued inconsistency on these issues may lead the Court to
revisit this question. Compare In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582
F.3d 156, 177 (1st Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Buckman and finding no preemption because
suit did not involve "misrepresentations made directly to HCFA" and that "[a] t issue here is
a state law remedy for deceptive practices by a manufacturer against its customers"), with
Pa. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding
state law claims preempted by FDA regulations although "the FDCA is not as clearly a
'critical element'" as in Buckman), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem.).
170. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) ("[T]he jury verdict established
only that Phenergan's warning was insufficient. ... We therefore need not decide whether
a state rule proscribing [Phenergan's] intravenous administration would be pre-empted.").
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requirements. 171 The Court has been extremely reluctant to entertain
such challenges, invoking standing, ripeness, and APA jurisdictional re172
quirements as barriers to judicial involvement.
A prime example is Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, a 1990 decision in which the Court rejected an environmental organization's effort
to challenge what the organization called a Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) program for determining when public lands could be opened up
for additional uses such as mining. 173 By a 5-4 vote, the Court insisted
that the organization could not challenge the agency's general approach
to making such determinations; instead, it was limited to targeting final
BLM decisions to open up specific lands, and only then when the organization could show those decisions had an immediate or actual effect on
the organization's members. 174 Noting the organization's claim that violation of governing statutory requirements was "rampant" in the land review program, Justice Scalia's majority opinion responded: "Perhaps so.
But respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by
court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of
175
Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made."
The latest manifestation of this resistance to suits targeting general
agency policies or performance came in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, a
decision issued just the day before Wyeth. 176 Summers involved a challenge brought by environmental organizations to the Forest Service's policy, embodied in an agency regulation, of excluding certain limited timber sales from the notice, comment, and appeals processes statutorily
mandated for Forest Service projects. 177 The Court dismissed the challenge, again in a 5-4 decision with Justice Scalia writing for the majority,
underscoring that the organizations had settled their claims with respect
171. Although my focus here is on challenges to federal agency action, for analogous
decisions rejecting challenges to state or local policies on constitutional grounds, see, e.g.,
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (denying standing to challenge police
use of choke holds); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (deeming district court
injunction on municipal police department overbroad and, regardless, finding lack of
justiciable case or controversy).
172. This reluctance has developed over time. In the 1960s and early 1970s, fears of
agency capture fueled expansions in standing and development of more rigorous
doctrines of judicial review. Although those decisions remain good law, over the ensuing
decades the Court has demonstrated far greater skepticism about the appropriateness of
using the courts as a mechanism to address broad agency failure. See Merrill, Capture
Theory, supra note 122, at 1039-44, 1059-67 ("Starting in the late 1960s, many federal
judges became convinced that agencies were prone to capture and related defects andmore importantly-that they were in a position to do something about it."); id. at 1073-74
(noting literature and "today's general climate" evidence "deep skepticism about all
government institutions, combined with very little sense that judges have any tools that
allow them to do something about it").
173. 497 U.S. 871, 875, 900 (1990).
174. Id. at 889, 891-93.
175. Id. at 891.
176. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009).
177. Id. at 1147-48.
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to the one specific project they had identified. According to the Court,
absent an identifiable project they were challenging, the organizations
could not establish sufficient actual and imminent injury to satisfy consti17 s
tutional standing requirements.
This is all standard standing fare, and the result in Summers is of a
piece with existing precedent.1 79 To be sure, standing analysis is notoriously malleable, and the Court has at times found standing to challenge
agency failure to comply with governing statutes despite complaints that
the plaintiffs asserted only a generalized grievance and lacked the type of
specific and individualized injury the Constitution requires 80° However,
the Court has been more consistent-and sometimes unanimous-in rejecting attempts to target general policies or programmatic approaches
guiding federal administration, limiting its involvement to instances in
which a specific agency decision is at issue."" Underlying these decisions, including those which turn on an interpretation of the jurisdictional requirements of the APA, are separation of powers concerns about
the appropriate limits on federal court oversight of governmental administration. According to the Court, "broad programmatic attack[s]" inappropriately "inject[ I ... [courts] into day-to-day agency management"
and risk 'judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which
178. Id. at 1149-51.
179. See Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court 18 (Case Research
Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09-32, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1497037 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) ("The Court may appear to have taken a slight step back from Massachusetts'
permissive approach to standing in Summers .... "). Summers does help resolve debates
over standing to sue on procedural violations. For instance, of the requirements laid out
for notice-and-comment rulemaking in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006), the Court stated
that "deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by
the deprivation-a procedural right in vacuo-is insufficient to create Article III standing."
Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151. But, as in its 1992 Lujan decision, the result seems to turn on
parsing a terse concurrence by Justice Kennedy. See Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Summers is also important to the question of when the possibility of harm to
some of an organization's members is sufficiently great to support organizational standing.
See generally Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic
Standing, but a "Realistic Threat" of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 Envtl. L. 89 (2010)
(discussing this aspect of Summers).
180. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522, 524-25 (2007) (holding
potential injury from climate change suffices for standing to challenge federal agency's
failure to regulate new auto emissions, notwithstanding "climate-change risks are 'widely
shared"' and fact that such emissions are only one contributor to global warming); FEC v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998) (rejecting claim that informational harm to voters from
federal agency's nonenforcement of election law was too generalized to support standing
because shared by all voters).
181. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64, 66-67, 71-72
(2004) (refusing to entertain "broad programmatic attack" on agency); Ohio Forestry
Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-37 (1998) (finding agency decision not ripe for
review).
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courts lack both expertise and information to resolve."' 18 2 For similar reasons, the Court has also been reluctant to entertain challenges to agency
inaction and agency delay, holding even challenges to specific agency
nonenforcement decisions presumptively nonreviewable. 18 3
One seeming outlier from this line of cases is the Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. There, the Court held that Massachusetts
had standing to challenge a refusal by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases as air pollutants under the
Clean Air Act (CAA). 18 4 In so concluding, the Court put particular emphasis on Massachusetts's status as "a sovereign State," noting that
"[w] hen a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives" to the federal government. 185 That transfer of authority, combined with Congress "ha[ving] ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts
(among others) by prescribing [air pollutant] standards" and having provided a procedural right to challenge EPA's rulemaking denial, meant
that Massachusetts was "entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.' 8 6 The Court supported its invocation of a special role for the states
with citations to its parens patriae jurisprudence, under which the Court
has long upheld the ability of a state to sue asserting "quasi-sovereign"
interests, which include a state's "interests in the health and well-being of
its residents" and "in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful place
within the federal system. '187 But the Court not only offered little clarification of how exactly Massachusetts's status as a state factored into its
ability to sue, it also proceeded to argue that Massachusetts had standing
182. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64, 66-67; see also Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148 (stating "courts
have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action" except when part of
their "traditional role of... redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual or imminently threatened
injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law").
183. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has recognized on
several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce...
is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion."); see also
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527 (distinguishing denial of rulemaking petitions from other
forms of agency inaction). Summers itself did not go so far as that; instead, the majority
acknowledged that the organizations could have standing to challenge the Forest Service's
failure to provide an opportunity for notice, comment, or appeal in conjunction with a
specific project. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151. Yet the majority erected a very high
evidentiary burden for standing to be found, requiring the organizations to identify not
only specific timber salvage sales exempt from such procedures under the Forest Service's
regulation, but also specific plans by particular members to use precisely those small
parcels of the national forests where the sales would occur. Id. at 1150-53. For a
discussion of the Court's precedent rejecting challenges to the general manner in which
agencies operate and its approach to agency inaction more broadly, see Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1657, 1664-75, 1705-11 (2004).
184. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516-26.
185. Id. at 518-19.
186. Id. at 519-20.
187. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
602-09 (1982) (describing development of parens patriae doctrine).
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in terms typical of those used for private parties, such as the fact that
Massachusetts owned substantial coastal property that could be affected
188
by rising sea levels.
In any event, Massachusetts differed from other administrative law decisions in this line by targeting a specific agency action: denial of a
rulemaking petition. The Court itself emphasized this feature in finding
the case justiciable.' 89 Thus, although Massachusetts stands out as a relatively rare challenge to agency nonenforcement, the Court did not treat
the decision as an exception to its prohibition on broad challenges to
agency policy and performance. 190
This administrative law precedent rejecting broad challenges to
agency policy and performance might appear at first glance to have little
in common with Wyeth and the recent preemption decisions. Most obviously, the Summers line of cases are fundamentally about separation of
powers and the role of the federal courts in overseeing the functioning of
federal agencies. Federalism does not factor into these cases which, other
than Massachusetts, do not involve the states or state law claims at all. Yet
a central issue underlies and links these seemingly disparate areas ofjurisprudence. That issue is how the courts should respond to the potential
for poor administrative performance and failure of federal agencies to
fulfill their statutory responsibilities.
Moreover, Summers and the preemption decisions took notably different stances on this issue, albeit through different doctrinal rubrics that
forestall any direct conflict. In Summers, the Court portrayed the claim
that the Forest Service was failing to adhere to governing statutes as fundamentally off limits to judicial review because it was framed as a challenge to the agency's general policy, divorced from any concrete application. 19 1 The impact that potentially precluding judicial review would
have on agency decisionmaking-good or ill-was irrelevant and not dis188. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521-23; Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at
2037-39 & n.51, 2062-63 (discussing traditional standing elements and potential "special
solicitude" for Massachusetts); see also Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater
Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for
States, 49 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 1701, 1746-47 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing]
(arguing Massachusetts does not provide clear test for state standing); Kathryn A. Watts &
Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than
Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1029, 1030-31 (2008) (noting Massachusetts v. EPA's
somewhat unusual" approach to standing that "blended the conventional Lujan analysis"
with "standing analysis [based) on the state's sovereign interest at stake in the litigation").
189. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 ("Congress has moreover authorized this type
of challenge to EPA action.").
190. See id. at 527-28 (distinguishing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), and
noting "[t]here are key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an
agency's decision not to initiate an enforcement action").
191. See supra notes 178, 181, and accompanying text; see also supra text
accompanying notes 181-182 (discussing Court's consistent rejection of broad attacks on
agencies' general policies or programmatic approaches).
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cussed. 19 2 By contrast, in the preemption decisions the Court invoked
factors undermining general agency performance, such as insufficient resources and informational disadvantages, as centrally relevant considerations in assessing the strength of preemption claims. 193 The Court did
not demand evidence that these factors had played a role in producing
the specific agency decisions at issue-the FTC's position on the
Cambridge Filter Method, the FDA's approval of Phenergan, or the
OCC's regulation construing visitorial powers to include state law enforcement. Equally divergent was the Court's focus on the incentive effects of state law liability and its willingness-expressly in Wyeth, more
tacitly in Altria and Cuomo-to strategically employ judicial proceedings
to improve the overall quality of federal agency decisionmaking. Left
wholly unexplained is why, if policing general federal agency performance represents an illegitimate overstepping of the judicial role, the
courts can consider general agency performance when determining
whether state law should be deemed preempted.
To be sure, Altria, Wyeth, and Cuomo are individuated in precisely the
way the Court found lacking in Summers, thereby forestalling any issue of
satisfying Article III jurisdictional requirements. This is characteristic of
preemption challenges generally; they emerge from discrete contexts involving allegedly conflicting federal and state law and thus involve a limited group of potential plaintiffs. Such individuation is particularly pronounced when preemption claims arise in conjunction with tort suits,
which often involve specific injured plaintiffs. At the same time, preemption determinations frequently have a systemic flavor, because they require consideration of the overall relationship of federal and state law in
a given regulatory context. Such overall assessments are particularly characteristic of implied preemption claims, which, as Justice Thomas protested, by their nature look beyond the text of the federal statute. 19 4 Further, the Court's insistence that preemption is a question traditionally left
for judicial resolution may help alleviate any separation of powers concerns that the courts are overstepping their constitutional role in consid19 5
ering systemic aspects of federal regulation in this context.
Although the simultaneously individuated and systemic character of
preemption analysis no doubt contributed to the Court's greater willing192. See supra text accompanying notes 176-181. National Wildlife Federationis even
clearer in insisting that overall agency functioning is simply not relevant to judicial analysis.
See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
193. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) ("The FDA has limited
resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market .... ").
194. See id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I have become increasingly skeptical
of this Court's 'purposes and objectives' pre-emption jurisprudence . . . [in which] the
Court routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy
objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not
embodied within the text of federal law.").
195. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2094-96 (defending
subconstitutional enforcement of federalism values as properly within judicial power).
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ness to address overall agency performance in the preemption decisions
than in Summers, this feature does not fully explain the Court's different
stance. Summers's denial of standing seems more the result of the Court's
reluctance to police overall federal agency functioning than the other
way around, 196 and it is precisely the lack of a similar reluctance in the
preemption decisions that requires explanation. Moreover, a broad view
of federal agency performance necessarily downplays the details of specific cases and focuses instead on the general features of a regulatory
scheme. This dynamic is strikingly present in Wyeth, in the majority's unwillingness to delve into the particulars of the FDA's assessment of
Phenergan's risk (particulars emphasized at length by the dissent) at the
same time as it underscored the general information gains that state liability could bring.1 9 7 In addition, even if preemption claims require
some broader assessment of the nature of the federal regulatory scheme,
they surely do not necessitate consideration of whether in practice the
federal agency will be able to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. And the
more the Court seeks to use preemption to influence how federal agencies function, the more it would seem to be impinging upon agency
programmatic choices and enforcement discretion, which National
Wildlife Federationand similar decisions insist should be left to the political
branches to control.1 98 In any event, neither the individuated nor systemic aspects of preemption analysis help clarify the contrast between the
Court's approach in Wyeth and its position in Buckman-also a preemption decision and thus sharing these individuated and systemic features.

196. Significantly, the agency's policy was codified in a governing regulation, and the
plaintiffs had submitted additional affidavits after settling their claims with respect to the
specific project previously at issue that the Court refused to consider. See Summers v.
Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147 (2009) ("[A]mendments to the Forest Service's
manual of implementing procedures ...provided that fire-rehabilitation activities on areas
of less than 4,200 acres, and salvage-timber sales of 250 acres or less, did not cause a
significant environmental impact and thus would be categorically exempt from the
requirement to file an EIS or EA." (citing National Environmental Policy Act
Documentation Needed for Fire Management Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, 33,824 (June
5, 2003); National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Limited Timber
Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,598, 44,607 (July 29, 2003))); id. at 1153 (rejecting dissent's
argument that Court "should also have considered the late-filed affidavits"). To be sure,
the plaintiffs may have trouble demonstrating standing going forward, but that is because
the Court is applying a very high threshold for showing standing in this context, see supra
note 183, which may reflect the determination of a majority of Justices that this type of
challenge does not belong in court.
197. Compare Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198-99 (emphasizing Vermont courts rejected
Wyeth's suggestion that FDA intended to prevent strengthening of Phenergan's label),
with id. at 1222-27 (Alito, J., dissenting) (detailing Wyeth's interactions with FDA over
Phenergan's label).
198. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990); see also sources cited
supra note 181 (demonstrating Court's aversion to challenges to agency programmatic
choices).
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C. Direct Versus IndirectEfforts at Agency Reform
Put simply, the Court was far more willing to address overall agency
failure and to try to improve agency performance in the recent preemption decisions than it was in Buckman or its administrative law precedent.
The puzzle is how to explain this difference. The Court itself offers no
clarification. Plainly, an important factor is shifting majorities and the
idiosyncratic preferences of swing Justices; the four Justices in dissent in
Summers were in the majority in Wyeth, Altria, and Cuomo. 199 Other contextual differences have been considered above. 20 0 But is there anything
else about the preemption decisions that might justify the Court's varied
responses?
One notable difference is that none of the state claims or laws at
issue in the recent preemption decisions directly targeted federal agency
decisionmaking.2 0 1 Instead, they affected federal regulation and federal
agency performance indirectly-whether by influencing the behavior of
regulated entities, supplementing federal oversight efforts, or compensating for failures in federal enforcement. As Catherine Sharkey has noted,
this is true even of Wyeth, which involved a general state failure-to-warn
claim that did not take issue with any FDA decision. 20 2 Although the
Court undertook to review the FDA's position on the preemptive effect of
drug labeling decisions, it did so only to determine what weight to assign
to the agency's position in the Court's own independent assessment of
preemption. As a result, the Court's conclusion that the agency's view on
drug labeling preemption was procedurally and substantively unsound
simply meant that the Court ignored the agency's view, rather than vacating or remanding the drug labeling regulation in which this view was put
forward. Similarly, the Court did not directly question the FDA's approval of Phenergan's label, but instead emphasized the limited scope of
this approval. 20 3 Although Wyeth was centrally concerned with improving
the FDA's performance, the Court limited itself to indirect techniques by
which to achieve this goal, such as fostering greater information disclo199. Justices Scalia and Kennedy switch positions among these cases. Justice Scalia
wrote the majority opinions in Cuomo and Summers but dissented in the other two
preemption cases, whereas Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Altria, Wyeth, and
Summers but dissented in Cuomo. As noted above, the split summary affirmance in Desiano
may also suggest some movement away from Buckman.
200. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
interpretation contingencies and mapping different Justices' voting in these cases).
201. As Part III below makes clear, I ultimately conclude that such a direct-indirect
distinction fails to justify the Court's differential treatment of these lines of decision.
202. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 67, at 2185-88 (underscoring
indirect aspect of Wyeth and viewing it as creating possibility for indirect challenges to
agency rulemaking and other administrative decisionmaking); see also Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at
1201 ("We are faced with no... regulation in this case, but rather with an agency's mere
assertion that state law is an obstacle to achieving its statutory objectives.").
203. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1194, 1196-99.
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sure or using deference as a carrot to incentivize better agency assessments of state law's impact on federal regulation.
Altria and Cuomo were similarly indirect in their policing of federal
agency action. Rather than directly challenging the FTC's inaction on
the Cambridge Filter Method, Altria supplemented the F'C's failed oversight with a potentially powerful state law incentive to offer more accurate
assessments of tar and nicotine yields.20 4 The OCC's regulation interpreting the NBA as preempting state law enforcement efforts was directly
at issue in Cuomo, and the decision rendered that provision in the OCC's
regulation essentially void. 20 5 Again, however, the state law actions authorized in Cuomo were not state law challenges to OCC regulatory decisions, but instead enforcement actions against national banks. To the
extent Cuomo serves to improve federal bank regulation, it will be by protecting against regulatory gaps resulting from OCC nonenforcement with
state law enforcement, not by directly overturning any specific OCC
20 6
decisions.
The indirect aspect of the preemption decisions was not emphasized
by the Court. Nonetheless, it is a significant feature of these decisionsand of preemption challenges generally. Such challenges typically arise,
as in Altria and Wyeth, out of disputes between two private parties rather
than a suit against the federal government, with state and federal law intersecting only in their application to the same private conduct. 20 7 Cases
occur in which the federal government is a party, such as Cuomo, but they
are rare. 20 8 Even when the federal government is a party, it is still usually
affected indirectly through the impact of state law on the behavior of
204. Cf. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 544 (2008) ("[N]either [of the Act's
purposes] would be served by limiting the States' authority to prohibit deceptive
statements in cigarette advertising.").
205. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
206. Although the state banking laws at issue in Cuomo directly applied to national
banks, the Court has long denied that their status as federally chartered corporations and
federal instrumentalities entitles them to any particular exemption from state law. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924) ("[N]ational banks are subject to the
laws of a State in respect of their affairs ....").
207. See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal
Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195, 2218 (2003)
("In most preemption cases, the federal and state governments do not confront each other
directly."); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1220 (3d ed. 2000)
(" [T] he federal-state interaction has been indirect: the question has been how to allocate
constitutional power as between the two levels of government when each seeks to deal with
the same area of private conduct.").
208. An ongoing prominent example of such involvement is the federal government's
suit to have Arizona's new immigration law declared preempted. See United States v.
Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 2926157 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2010). Of course,
the government often participates in preemption challenges before the Court as amicus
curiae. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 471 & n.103 (noting
outcome of preemption challenges frequently tracks position adopted by Solicitor
General).
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federally regulated entities, rather than head-on. 20 9 Indeed, this indirect
aspect might be thought especially true of preemption challenges involving state tort law, given that tort law itself operates indirectly. As the
Court stated in distinguishing between ajury verdict and a legal requirement: "A requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed"; ajury verdict
is "an event . . . that merely motivates an optional decision ....
[W] hether ajury verdict will prompt the manufacturer to take any partic210
ular action" is a matter of speculation.
Equally important, the indirect character of these decisions offers a
possible ground on which to distinguish the Court's precedent that is
resistant to efforts to police agency performance. In particular, the state
law claim in Buckman targeted federal agency decisionmaking more directly than most state tort claims and preemption litigation. The only
basis offered for liability was the company's interactions with the FDA,
and a finding of liability necessarily would have called the FDA's approval
of the bone screws into question. This direct targeting of the FDA's decision was emphasized most in the concurrence, which concluded that the
suit was preempted because the FDA had done nothing to remove the
bone screws from the market. According to the concurrence, an FDA
determination that "fraud has occurred and that such fraud requires the
removal of a product from the market" was necessary to establish the causality element of the fraud claim "without second-guessing the [agency's]
decisionmaking or overburdening its personnel." 2 11 The majority, by
contrast, focused primarily on the impact that such fraud claims would
2 12
have on the FDA by dint of their effects on regulated parties' behavior.
Yet concerns about immediate effects on the FDA, such as the danger
that regulated parties would deluge the FDA with unhelpful information,
also surface in the majority opinion, leading it to insist that fraud-onagency claims would have a "direct impact on the United States." 2 13 Also
revealing is the Buckman majority's insistence that the fraud claims were
not independently based in state law and instead represented an effort to
enforce the disclosure requirements of the FDCA. The majority repeatedly underscored that this enforcement task was statutorily assigned to
the FDA, thus portraying fraud-on-the-FDA claims as directly interfering
2 14
with the agency's regulatory role.
209. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 115, at 476 ("Failure-to-warn litigation does
not undercut [the FDA's] authority. Failure-to-warn litigation challenges the company's
failure to warn doctors and patients about a risk and seeks money damages for injuries
caused by the lack of an adequate warning. Plaintiffs do not seek injunctions . . ").
210. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005); see also Klass, supra
note 148, at 1567-75 (faulting Court for "implicitly classifying all tort law as public law").
211. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353-54 (2001) (Stevens,
J.,concurring).
212. Id. at 350-51 (majority opinion).
213. Id. at 351 n.6.
214. Id. at 348-50 & n.4.
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Administrative law challenges operate still more directly on federal
agencies. Sustaining such a challenge generally results in vacatur of an
agency decision and a remand to the agency for further action-or
potentially in outright reversal when a court concludes the agency was
acting outside of its authority. 215 Even when an agency retains substantial
discretion on remand, it cannot continue with its chosen course of action
without responding to the court in some fashion. The direct aspect of
administrative law challenges is evident in Summers. The claim there was
brought directly against the Forest Service, through its officers, and the
lower court's decision sustaining the environmental organizations' challenge had resulted in a nationwide injunction against the Forest Service's
timber salvage regulation. 2 16 Moreover, at issue was not a substantive requirement governing the behavior of third parties, but instead a question
of the procedures that the Forest Service itself was required to follow in
217
making forest management decisions.
In addition, a distinction between direct and indirect efforts at
agency reform has considerable intuitive appeal from both a federalism
and a separation of powers perspective. Direct state targeting of federal
agency action through state law brings to the fore concerns about states
overstepping their constitutional role and undermining the efficacy and
supremacy of the federal government. 218 Such fears of improper state
involvement in federal affairs seem to animate Buckman.2 19 The danger
of improper state interference in federal regulation appears mitigated
215. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006) (stating reviewing court "shall ... set aside agency
action" if found unlawful on a variety of specified grounds); 3 Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Administrative Law Treatise § 18.1, at 1675 (5th ed. 2010). The option of remand without
vacatur is an important administrative law development, but does not alter the basic
proposition here that agencies must respond to a reviewing court's decision or face
outright reversal, whether sooner or later.
216. See Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 690-91 (9th Cir. 2007)
(affirming nationwide injunction against two regulations and remanding on ripeness
grounds as to regulations not applied to proposed project); see also Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1153 (2009) ("Since we have resolved this case on the ground
of standing, we need not reach . . . the question whether, if respondents prevailed, a
nationwide injunction would be appropriate.").
217. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149. Similarly, the suit in National Wildlife Federationwas
brought directly against the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of BLM, and the
Interior Department; the National Wildlife Federation sought to force the agency to
change its approach to assessing whether public lands could be opened for additional uses
and to invalidate specific agency decisions reclassifying particular lands. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 272-73 (D.D.C. 1985).
218. Even state suits targeting federal action under federal law have occasionally
provoked such a reaction, although such suits are now well accepted. See infra text
accompanying notes 269-273 (discussing evolution toward acceptance).
219. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350 ("State-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably
conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration's
judgment and objectives."); id. ("As a practical matter, complying with the FDA's detailed
regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States' tort regimes will dramatically increase the
burdens facing potential applicants-burdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting
the FDCA and the MDA."); see also Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th
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when state law operates wholly independently of federal law and without
directly targeting federal agencies. 220 In such contexts, the states' claims
of sovereignty also appear at their strongest; they are acting within their
traditional spheres rather than reaching out to insert themselves into
purely federal arenas. Indeed, states as indirect instigators of federal
agency reform maps well on a standard account of federalism's benefits,
under which states serve as laboratories of experimentation devising new
regulatory strategies from which federal agencies-and other states-can
learn if they choose. This indirect character also lends state law a less
intrusive air: Wyeth, though acknowledging state law can have an impact,
casts it not as displacing federal agency discretion but instead as affecting
22 1
agency behavior around the edges.
The appearance of not stepping directly into the policy domains of
the executive branch also helps explain why a Court that had just handed
down Summers did not feel the same separation of powers concerns about
assessing how state law claims could improve overall federal agency performance in Wyeth. Direct challenges that seek to change broad policy or
overall aspects of agency performance seem to risk far greater intrusion
on agencies' operations and the policysetting prerogatives of the political
branches. Although Wyeth holds important lessons for the FDA about
how to proceed if it wants to influence future preemption determinations, the agency remains free to ignore these lessons if it so chooses. Not
so in the Summers context, where sustaining the challenge at issue would
have forced the Forest Service to change its approach to salvage fire sales.
III.

THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN REFORMING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION

In sum, the fact that the state laws involved in the preemption decisions did not directly target federal agency decisionmaking appears to be
an important ingredient in the Court's willingness to consider overall administrative performance in its analysis. Again, the Court itself does not
distinguish between direct and indirect efforts at federal agency reform,
so this account entails some reading between the lines. But such a distinction helps resolve the tension between the preemption decisions and
other instances in which the Court has rejected both state and federal law
efforts to police federal agency performance. The distinction also appears to resonate with federalism principles, and thus accords with the
Court's evident linkage of federalism and agency failure concerns in the
preemption decisions.
Despite its attractiveness, however, a distinction between direct and
indirect efforts at federal agency reform is ultimately unsatisfying, at least
Cir. 2004) (describing danger of state interference in federal administration as "interbranch-meddling concerns").
220. See Richard S. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73
Yale L.J. 1385, 1394 (1964) (collecting cases supporting state court jurisdiction in areas
involving "no direct interference with or obstruction of federal functions").
221. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203 (discussing Wyeth).
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if it is posited as a categorical matter. As I argue below, the impact of
indirect reform measures on federal agencies can be very significant in
practice, and it can be quite difficult to separate measures that directly
target federal agencies from those that do so only indirectly. Moreover,
efforts by states to directly regulate federal agencies and officials are not
necessarily at odds with our constitutional structure. Indeed, once federal and state authority is recognized to be largely concurrent, states can
have quite legitimate reasons for directly targeting federal agency decisionmaking. In fact, state efforts to directly challenge poor federal
agency performance, albeit under federal law and in federal courts, may
better accord with constitutional federalism principles than more indirect
reform efforts.
The failure of the direct-indirect distinction to ultimately justify the
Court's divergent case law suggests a more radical possibility: Perhaps
Wyeth and the preemption decisions should be read as assigning the states
a special role in policing federal administration across the board,
through both direct and indirect measures. Such an approach offers intriguing possibilities as a mechanism for further development of federalist principles within our contemporary national administrative state. This
view of the decisions would represent a more significant reorientation of
the Court's jurisprudence, however. More importantly, much analytic
work needs to be done to clarify what such a state role would mean in
practice and to justify why the courts, rather than Congress, should be the
ones to assign the states special responsibilities for monitoring federal
administration.
A. The Failure of Functionaland FormalistJustifications of the Direct-Indirect
Distinction
As described above, the appeal of the direct-indirect distinction is
twofold: Indirect state efforts at federal agency reform appear less intrusive and more reflective of the proper relationship between federal and
state governments-and between agencies and the federal courts-than
efforts that directly challenge agency performance. 222 On greater scrutiny, however, these functional and formalist justifications of the directindirect distinction prove unavailing.
1. FunctionalLimitations of a Direct-IndirectDistinction. - Perhaps the
most obvious critique of a distinction between direct and indirect efforts
at agency reform is that the perception of indirect measures as unobtrusive is often quite clearly mistaken. In practice, indirect measures can
have as great (or greater) an impact on agency functioning and discretion as direct reform efforts.
This critique, in fact, underlies arguments for broad implied administrative preemption, such as those made by the FDA in Wyeth and espoused by the Wyeth dissent. Under that view, state law liability seriously
222. See supra text accompanying notes 218-220.
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impairs the FDA's efforts to create an optimal regulatory regime because
it leads regulated entities to take greater precautions than the agency believes appropriate. 223 The Wyeth majority downplayed such an impact,
rejecting the proposition that FDA approvals represent a careful and upto-date calibration of the various risks involved in the thousands of drugs
the agency oversees.2 24 It is not necessary, however, to accept that proposition to conclude that the majority nonetheless paints an overly rosy
account of Wyeth's impact on the FDA.225 What the majority ignores is
the high likelihood that drug manufacturers may try to inoculate themselves against future liability by getting the FDA to reject alternative warnings.2 26 To put the point in Buckman's terms, manufacturers now have
"an incentive to submit a deluge of information" on possible risks and to
push for an agency response rejecting label changes. 227 The result could
well be substantial burdens on an already underresourced and overtaxed
223. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1218 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
real issue is whether a state tortjury can countermand the FDA's considered judgment that
Phenergan's FDA-mandated warning label renders its .. . use 'safe.'"); see also Schuck,
supra note 28, at 78 ("The conflicting standards between state courts (and juries) and the
federal agencies create inconsistent incentives for manufacturers.").
224. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200-04.
225. For contrasting views of the FDA's performance in this regard, compare Kessler
& Vladeck, supra note 115, at 483 ("[W]e . . . have reservations about the FDA's
preemption position because it depends on the proposition that the FDA is capable of
policing the marketplace effectively on its own."), with Schuck, supra note 28, at 91, 113
(arguing that, in its drug safety decisions, "the FDA exercises an authority that is probably
more comprehensive and technocratically rigorous than that exercised by any other
federal regulator," although also acknowledging information and resource disadvantages
that hamper FDA). Recent reports on the FDA's failures to monitor drugs adequately postapproval support Kessler & Vladeck's more skeptical view. See Subcomm. on Sci. & Tech.,
FDA Sci. Bd., FDA Science and Mission at Risk 2, 6 (2007) ("[T]he Agency suffers from
serious scientific deficiencies and is not positioned to meet current or emerging regulatory
responsibilities."); U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-06-402, Drug Safety:
Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-making and Oversight Process 5
(2006) (reporting management deficiency in postmarketing oversight); Comm. on the
Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety Sys., Inst. of Med. of the Nat'l Acads., The Future of
Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public 193-94 (2007) (reporting
general lack of resources preventing effective postmarketing drug safety); see also Citizens
Advisory Comm. on the Food & Drug Admin., Report to the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, H.R. Doc. No. 84-227, at 53 (1st Sess. 1955) (reporting on
budgetary and staffing deficiencies). For similar criticisms of the FDA's preapproval
review, see, e.g., Reed Abelson, Quickly Vetted, Treatment Is Offered to Cancer Patients,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2008, at Al; Barry Meier, F.D.A. Seeks Better Data from Tests of
Devices, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2009, at B1.
226. Cf. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 67, at 2186, 2189
(characterizing Wyeth as consistent with agency reference model under which agencies
should be required "to provide .. .comprehensive, written responses" to applications by
drug manufacturers to change their labels, and arguing "drug manufacturers, and other
interested parties, should be able to challenge . . .refusals by the agency to create the
necessary agency record" in order to "preserve their ability to mount a preemption
defense").
227. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001).
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agency. 228 Even a move seemingly quite deferential to agency decisionmaking, such as allowing state law fraud-on-the-agency claims to go forward only when the agency itself concludes that fraud occurred, could
prove to have a substantial impact on agency functioning. The possibility
of such liability seems likely to lead manufacturers to fight FDA fraud
determinations vigorously and to result in the agency imposing weaker
penalties. 229 The Arizona district court recently underscored this point
in a decision that held much of Arizona's new immigration law preempted. Although the law did not target federal immigration administration directly, the court concluded it would prove too burdensome on federal administration because it would lead to "an increase in the number
of requests for determinations of immigration status, . . [and thus] divert resources from the federal government's other responsibilities and
priorities."

23 0

That indirect regulatory approaches are powerful is, of course, not a
novel point. To the contrary, it underlies much modem regulatory design, such as efforts to rely on market-based regulation rather than topdown, command-and-control approaches.2 3 1 Indeed, the effectiveness of
indirect approaches is heralded by the view of tort in regulatory rather
than compensatory terms, as well as by Wyeth itself, which defends contin-

228. This situation might eventually inure to the agency's benefit, insofar as it gains
useful information or its inability to respond leads the pharmaceutical industry to lobby for
increases in the FDA's budget. See Schuck, supra note 28, at 108 (noting Professor
Merrill's speculation that "the industry... might press Congress to provide more resources
to enable the agency to respond to [its] requests"). But that potential outcome only
underscores the impact preemption can have as an indirect tool for influencing behavior.
See, e.g., Hills, Against Preemption, supra note 24, at 22 ("By giving nonfederal lawmakers
a wider scope for entrepreneurial activity, a clear statement rule against federal
preemption increases their capacity to influence congressional agendas in dramatic
ways.").
229. Some commentators already fault the FDA for its limited fraud enforcement
efforts. See Derrick Price, FDCA Medical Device Amendments and Federal Preemption:
Putting the Screws to Spinal Fusion Patients, 3 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 83, 105-07
(2002) (describing criticisms of FDA enforcement efforts); see also Thomas 0. McGarity,
Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts,
41 Washburn L.J. 549, 563-70 (2002) (describing impediments to aggressive agency fraud
enforcement). Commentators advocating this approach to the Desiano and Buckman
situations largely have not discussed the potential impact subsequent tort liability could
have on agency fraud determinations. See, e.g., Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961,
966 (6th Cir. 2004) (failing to discuss this dynamic).
230. United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 2926157, at *11 (D.
Ariz. July 28, 2010).
231. A current example is the proposal to regulate greenhouse gases through federal
legislation creating a cap-and-trade system. See William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas
Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 San Diego
J. Climate & Energy L. 23, 26-28 (2009) [hereinafter Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas
Regulation] (describing proposal); see also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform
263-71 (1982) (criticizing command-and-control environmental regulation).
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ued state law liability for inadequate drug labels in large part because of
232
its indirect beneficial impact on federal regulation.
Further, direct regulatory approaches can be structured so that regulated entities retain substantial discretion over their actions. Performance-based regulation, which imposes outcome measures that regulated
parties must meet but allows flexibility in how they do so, is a prime example. 2 33 Perhaps more analogous to the agency reform efforts at issue
here, direct legal relief intended to address widespread failure in the operations of government institutions can be structured to preserve substantial discretion on the part of the institutions involved. 234 So, too, some
direct challenges to general agency policies present less risk of intruding
on agency prerogatives than others. Summers, for example, involved a relatively narrow question of statutory interpretation about which the
agency had affirmatively adopted a position through notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Although a decision against the agency would force it to
comply with procedural requirements, resolution of such a challenge
seems less likely to tread on legitimate agency operational discretion than
one that challenges "[g]eneral deficiencies in compliance" with a statu23 5
tory mandate.
Equally important, no clear divide separates state measures that affect federal agencies directly from those that do so indirectly. Instead, an
array of potential approaches exists with many measures blending both
indirect and direct elements. This situation is most clearly illuminated by
state statutes addressing tort liability for pharmaceutical products. A
number of states have adopted statutory immunity measures that preclude liability to some degree for drugs approved by the FDA, provided
232. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1199-200 (2009) ("[Congress] may also
have recognized that state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating
manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings.").
Another recent example of the powerful indirect effect of preemption determinations
comes in the context of greenhouse gas regulation, where decisions rejecting preemption
claims against state nuisance suits are an important force behind growing industry
acceptance of new federal regulation. See Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation,
supra note 231, at 35 ("Polluters .. .see federal law as a means to undercut or preempt
outright state and local law as well as common law litigation directed at climate change and
its many contributing sources."); see also Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d
309, 369 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding city and private plaintiffs had standing to bring public
nuisance cause of action against defendant polluters).
233. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Performance-Based Regulation: Enterprise
Responsibility for Reducing Death, Injury, and Disease Caused by Consumer Products, 34
J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 1035, 1072 (2009) ("Performance-based regulation ties together
the freedom to sell products with the responsibility for resulting negative consequences,
leaving it to the firms to tailor the former in ways that minimize the latter.").
234. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1019 (2004) (describing "experimentalist
regulation" and noting, "[t]ypically, the regime leaves the parties with a substantial range
of discretion as to how to achieve the[ ] goals" of the regulation).
235. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004).
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the drug manufacturer complied with all regulations. 236 "Without exception, all of these state statutes contain a fraud exception, disabling immunity where the drug manufacturer has deceived or defrauded the
FDA. '237 Michigan's statute providing total immunity subject to such a
2 38
fraud exception was the statute at issue in Desiano.
Are such measures best understood as directly targeting the FDA's
processes or as independent measures focused on determining the scope
of state law immunity that take the FDA's processes into account only
indirectly? The most accurate answer would appear to be both; the
direct-indirect distinction simply does not map well here. Perhaps for
that reason, the scholarly commentary on the fraud exception does not
tend to consider this distinction pivotal. Instead, general agreement exists on the need to provide some exception for fraud as the price of preemption or immunity, in large part to support FDA regulation and ensure that the beneficial information disclosing effects of tort liability are
preserved. 2 39 Put differently, the fact that states are to some degree directly targeting FDA decisionmaking through these measures is not
thought necessarily problematic. Indeed, some proposals to mitigate the
impact of such fraud exemptions on the FDA would do so by making the
exemption's availability turn even more directly on the FDA's actions,
specifically on whether the FDA itself has determined that fraud has
240
occurred.
236. See Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 167, at 850 (detailing different types of
measures adopted by thirteen states); see also Pa. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc.,
499 F.3d 239, 242-47 (3d Cir. 2007) (analyzing exemption in Delaware Consumer Fraud
Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2513(b) (2005), which states, "[t] his section shall not apply...
[t] o any advertisement or merchandising practice which is subject to and complies with the
rules and regulations, of[,] and the statutes administered by, the Federal Trade
Commission"), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem.).
237. Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 167, at 850.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 164-169.
239. See Nagareda, supra note 28, at 46-47 ("[A] showing of... fraud [on the FDA]
should suffice to defeat the preemptive effect that a given FDA assessment of a device or
drug might otherwise have . . . ."); Schuck, supra note 28, at 83 ("Like all other tort
scholars, I favor an exception to both FDA preemption of tort claims and to any state law
regulatory compliance defense that might survive this preemption. . . ."); Sharkey, Fraud
Caveat, supra note 167, at 841 ("What I term the 'fraud caveat' to federal agency
preemption has great intuitive appeal.").
240. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("The fact that the [FDA] has done nothing to remove the devices from the
market, even though it is aware of the basis for the fraud allegations, convinces me that this
essential element of the claim cannot be proved."); Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d
961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (following Justice Stevens's approach of allowing liability when
FDA has determined fraud has occurred); Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 167, at
848-55 (calling Justice Stevens's approach a "promising compromise"). Peter Schuck
would seek to limit the exception's scope by instead imposing high proof burdens. See
Schuck, supra note 28, at 86 (noting that in his proposed exception "in order to survive a
motion to dismiss, the tort plaintiff would have to meet a pleading standard requiring
greater specificity with respect to both the allegations of disclosure deficit and supporting
the factual evidence").
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Similar mixed indirect and direct approaches exist in other contexts.
One example is state greenhouse gas measures that expressly seek to spur
federal action but also independently govern emissions within state borders. 24 1 Another is state legislation that aims to take advantage of federal
allowance for independent state law requirements that parallel those applicable under federal law. In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, for example, the
Court emphasized that preemption under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) would not apply to state causes
of action that were substantially equivalent to FIFRA's because the statute
limited preemption to state requirements that were "in addition to or
different from those required under [federal law] ."242 States seeking to
avoid preemption thus would seem well advised to directly model their
tort law and regulatory enactments on the requirements imposed by federal agencies, thereby once again blurring the line between state measures that directly target federal agency action and independent state law.
That blurring is evident even in the context of administrative law challenges. Although such challenges-for example, the claim that an
agency action was arbitrary and capricious-unquestionably involve direct agency targeting, in many ways their real power over time has
stemmed more from their indirect impact on how agencies function in
general than it has from their direct effect on the specific regulatory deci243
sion at issue.
241. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact
Review Process, Nat. Resources & Env't, Winter 2008, at 20, 20 ("So far, as in most aspects
of this issue, the states have been ahead of the federal government in considering climate
change and are developing procedures that may be applied more broadly if a more
sympathetic presidential administration comes into office."); see alsoJ.R. DeShazo &Jody
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1500 (2007) (discussing effect of state climate change initiatives on
federal legislation).
242. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005). For the provision of
FIFRA at issue, see 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). The FDCA contains similar language. See
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006) (allowing preemption for state statutes which are "different
from, or in addition to" federal law).
243, See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale
L.J. 38, 60 (1975) ("The effect of [thorough circuit court of appeals] judicial opinions
within the agency reaches beyond those who were concerned with the specific regulations
reviewed. They serve as a precedent for future rule-writers and give those who care about
well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those who
do not."); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on
Agency Discretion, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 429, 458-59 (1999) ("[T]here are indications that
ex-post review helps curb documented abuses of the regulatory system."). Even critics of
arbitrary and capricious review would seem to agree. The dominant complaint that such
review ossifies rulemaking emphasizes the broader impact such challenges have on
agencies and the incentives they create for agencies to act through other routes. See Jerry
L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 9-26 (1990) (describing
National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration's change in regulatory strategy from
rulemaking to recalls and identifying obstacles the legal system imposes on rulemaking as
important culprit behind shift).
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2. Formal Constitutional Limits on State Efforts to Directly Target Federal
Agencies and Federal Officials. - Viewed practically, therefore, the directindirect distinction has little to commend it; the distinction does not accurately identify more intrusive reform efforts and is likely to prove difficult to implement consistently. A harder question, however, is whether
formal constitutional principles nonetheless require such a distinction.
In assessing this argument, I want to focus only on the federalism
dimension and leave to the side the contention that direct federal judicial
efforts to reform federal agencies violate separation of powers requirements. As a general principle, the latter proposition is unsustainable.
The federal courts regularly undertake direct review of federal agency
action, pursuant to congressional instructions, and since Marbuy have
asserted power to enforce constitutional requirements on other branches
of federal government. 24 4 Summers is simply the last (as of this writing) in
a long line of decisions acknowledging that such judicial scrutiny is appropriate so long as Article III's requirements are met.24 5 The claim underlying the Summers line is instead that judicial efforts at wholesale agency
reform go beyond the courts' constitutional role and infringe on powers
assigned to Congress and the President under Articles I and 11.246 But
more importantly here, if direct judicial efforts at broad agency reform
are at odds with separation of powers, then judicial attempts to achieve
that result indirectly would appear to be equally constitutionally suspect-particularly given the potential impact of indirect reform efforts
on agency discretion. From a separation of powers perspective, therefore, the direct-indirect distinction has little formal bite.
From a federalism perspective, however, the situation initially appears quite different. Some indirect state impact on federal agencies and
federal regulation is inevitable given overlapping federal and state regula244. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
245. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148-49 (2009) (noting
courts have authority to "review and revise legislative and executive action" only when
necessary "to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused
by private or official violation of law"). Indeed, a case could be made that judicial review is
a constitutional imperative of broad agency delegations. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 522 (2010)
("The Court has made clear that broad congressional delegations of authority to
administrative agencies are constitutional, but it has failed to adequately consider whether
such delegations should come with constitutional strings attached.").
246. See sources cited supra notes 181, 198 (documenting Summers line of cases).
Similar concerns with excessively broad judicial remedies surface in cases in which the
federal courts have mandated at times quite sweeping changes in state and local agencies
to cure violations of constitutional and federal statutory rights. Yet here, too, the Court has
reaffirmed the federal courts' power to order relief necessary to cure specific constitutional
violations. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1996) ("It is the role of courts to
provide relief to claimants. .. who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it
is not the role of courts ... to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to
comply with the laws and the Constitution.").
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tory authority. At a minimum, such concurrent authority means federal
agencies need to regulate with an eye to the states to ensure that federal
policies do not interact with state requirements in unintended and undesired ways. State regulatory actions may also lead federal agencies to
change their policies and enforcement activities-whether by showcasing
more effective strategies and the existence of federal regulatory gaps, or
by prompting federal agencies to defend their turf.247 As the Court has
remarked, the indirect impact of state law on federal agencies "is but the
normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two
248
governments."
By contrast, state law that directly targets federal agencies and officers seems to fit uncomfortably with our formal constitutional federalist
structure, in particular the principle of federal supremacy. Such targeting raises the danger that "the operations of the general government may
at any time be arrested at the will of one of its members." 249 In Tarble's
Case, for example-an 1871 decision denying state courts habeas jurisdiction over federal officials to challenge military custody of an allegedly
underage soldier-the Court proclaimed that from "the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective
spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be
necessary . . . [for] the National government to preserve its rightful
supremacy."250 Similarly, fifty years earlier the Court denied the states

mandamus power over federal officials, holding in McClung v. Silliman
that the conduct of a federal government or agent "can only be controlled by the power that created him" and emphasizing the extraordi247. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863, 872-79,
885-86 (2006) (detailing effect of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's enforcement
actions against securities industry on the SEC, in particular sparking greater SEC
enforcement).
248. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939).
249. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (holding Maryland state tax on Bank of the United States
unconstitutional).
250. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407 (1871); see also id. at 409 ("It is manifest that the
powers of the National government could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all
times, if its acts could be interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or
tribunals of another sovereignty."); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858)
(holding unconstitutional state habeas relief against federal officer that contradicted prior
federal court decision). As noted below, see infra text accompanying note 270, Tarbe's
Case has received substantial criticism, but its prohibition on state habeas over federal
officials is generally acknowledged to remain the governing rule, at least as long as the
federal courts stand open for federal habeas claims and Congress has not sanctioned such
state relief. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to
Immigration Cases, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1068, 1074 n.31 (1998) (noting "implied exclusion
of state jurisdiction [over habeas claims] would vanish" if federal statutes withdrew federal
jurisdiction); Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92
Minn. L. Rev. 265, 268 (2007) (calling prohibition on state habeas over federal officials
"too widely accepted to be seriously questioned").
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nary character of mandamus. 251 The Court also initially voiced strong
concerns about the extent to which application of state law might unduly
25 2
interfere with the operations of federal agencies and instrumentalities.
Much of the resultant doctrine of federal intergovernmental immunity
has been cut back over time, with such concerns now addressed largely
under the aegis of preemption. 253 Still, some prohibitions remain that
underscore the importance of a direct-indirect distinction, such as the
rule that "the States can never tax the United States directly but can tax
any private parties with whom it does business, even though the financial
burden falls on the United States, as long as the tax" is nondiscriminatory.2 54 And at times federal officers have been held exempt from state
criminal law for actions within the scope of their federal duties, even ab255
sent a preempting federal statute, on grounds of federal supremacy.
251. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821). The extent to which the Court meant in
McClung to adopt a general rule against state mandamus is unclear; much of the Court's
reasoning appears to turn on its previous determination that the federal courts lacked
power of mandamus in the same dispute, which involved efforts to force a federal land
office official to issue a deed. See id. at 599-601, 605 (discussing Mclntire v. Wood, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 504 (1813), and emphasizing that federal government had "withh[eld] from its
own Courts[ ] the exercise of this controlling power. over its ministerial officers").
However, "McClung has been interpreted to exclude state court mandamus against federal
officials under any circumstances." Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 406 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Fallon et al., Hart &
Wechsler]; see also Arnold, supra note 220, at 1392 ("McClung has been deemed
controlling ... when state courts have been asked or have attempted to mandamus federal
officers."). The Court has never addressed whether the states have power to enjoin federal
officials, but several other courts have concluded from McClung and Tarble's Case that states
lack injunctive power as well. See, e.g., Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 37
N.E.2d 225, 226-27 (N.Y. 1941); see also Arnold, supra note 220, at 1393-406 (discussing
cases and arguing in favor of state court jurisdiction over injunctive suits); Martin H.
Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower
Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 88 (1975)
("[A] stronger case exists for forbidding [state court] injunctive power [against federal
officials] than for disallowing habeas power.").
252. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 326-30 ("[T]he law of Congress ...
must have its full and complete effects" and "cannot be either defeated or impeded by acts
of State legislation.").
253. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434-35 (1990) ("Claims to
any further degree of immunity must be resolved under principles of congressional preemption."); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 520-23 (1988) ("[G]overnment
contract immunities recognized under prior doctrine were, one by one, eliminated.").
254. Baker, 485 U.S. at 523; see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 435 ("A state regulation
is invalid only if it regulates the United States directly or discriminates against the Federal
Government or those with whom it deals."); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466, 487 (1939) (emphasizing "any indirect or incidental" burden borne by federal or state
government by other government's taxation of its employees "is but the normal incident of
the organization within the same territory of two governments" and is constitutional).
255. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1889) (holding federal marshal immune from
state criminal prosecution for actions undertaken to protect federal official and stating "if
in doing that act he did no more than what was necessary and proper for him to do, he
cannot be guilty of a crime under [state] law"); see also Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51,
56-57 (1920) (overturning federal mail truck driver's conviction and fine for failing to
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In the end, however, a categorical constitutional bar to direct state
law targeting of federal agencies and officers cannot be sustained. To
begin with, federal officers have never been deemed automatically exempt from state substantive law, including state criminal law. Instead, the
availability of immunity depends on the scope of the officials' authority
under federal law.256 More importantly, federal officers have long been
subject to state tort suits for their unlawful actions. 25 7 Indeed, tort liability represented a basic mechanism by which federal officers were held
accountable for exceeding their authority. 258 Rather than serving as a
bar to jurisdiction, federal officers had to show federal statutory authority
as an affirmative defense, and they were liable for damages under state
law if their actions were found unauthorized. 25 9 Such state tort suits
against federal officers based on their official conduct represent a direct
targeting of federal administrative action. 2 60 Although today direct state
obtain state license, stating "[s]uch a requirement does not merely touch the Government
servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of them in their specific attempt
to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the Government has
pronounced sufficient"); Waxman & Morrison, supra note 207, at 2232-37 (discussing
Neagle's approach to Supremacy Clause immunity).
256. See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 207, at 2202 ("Although the relevant case
law is limited, it does establish that an officer's entitlement to immunity is determined by
examining the reasonableness of his actions in light of his federal powers and duties alone,
irrespective of the requirements of state criminal law.").
257. See, e.g., Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 286-87 (1851) (allowing state
court trover action against postmaster); see also Arnold, supra note 220, at 1394
(discussing cases in which federal officials were sued for damages in state courts); Redish &
Woods, supra note 251, at 81-82 (same). In addition, the Court upheld the power of state
courts to issue writs of replevin and ejectment against federal officers. See United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218 (1882) (ejectment); Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1,
12-13 (1817) (replevin); Arnold, supra note 220, at 1394-95 (discussing ejectment and
replevin cases).
258. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1506-07
(1987) (discussing trespass suits as means of remedying unconstitutional federal searches);
Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 396, 409-10 (1987) (discussing "legality model" of executive immunity, under which
.officials of all ranks" may be sued for "depriv[ing] persons of liberty or property").
259. See Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 194-96, 232-60
(1965) (describing rule that officer could defend against damages actions if he "acted
within his colorable authority"); James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens:
Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 Geo. L.J. 117, 134 (2009) (noting that in
response to suit "[t]he official could respond by trying to show that the search was
authorized by federal law").
260. Jerry Mashaw appears to disagree, including these suits in the category of actions
to obtain indirect review of federal administrative action, along with tort actions involving
two private parties. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law
in the Gilded Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1399-402, 1407 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, Federal
Administration]; cf. Redish & Woods, supra note 251, at 82 ("Any resultant impingement
of the official duties of federal officers [from state tort suits] is, at most, indirect."). As
discussed below, however, Mashaw's prime focus is on distinguishing such tort actions from
suits that sought to directly control the actions of federal officers through injunctions or
writs of mandamus. See infra text accompanying notes 264-265. I agree that tort actions
operate more "indirectly" on federal officers than injunctions or mandamus. See supra
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tort liability for federal officers is largely precluded under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA),261 this immunity is the result of congressional
action rather than constitutional dictate. Moreover, the extent and scope
of a federal officer's tort liability still turns on state substantive law under
the FFCA, albeit now based on the federal statute's incorporation of state
2 62
law as the governing rule.
Two distinctions are critical to understanding the Court's varied jurisprudence here. The first is between efforts to control federal actions
in the future and efforts to remedy past federal misconduct. Both Tarbie's
Case and McClung involved the former; they were efforts to force federal
officials to undertake particular actions. 263 Jerry Mashaw has underscored that, until the twentieth century, such judicial relief was only narrowly available in federal court: "Direct review of administrative action by
mandamus or injunction was sharply limited by the Supreme Court's position that mandamus was inappropriate whenever the Administrator was
'264
engaged in anything more than a ministerial, nondiscretionary task.
But, as Mashaw notes, courts were much more receptive to common law
actions seeking simply to remedy past agency action alleged to have violated individuals' rights. 2 6 5 The Court's precedent prohibiting state eftext accompanying notes 207-210. But I disagree that such state actions against federal
officers based on their official conduct are best viewed as indirect challenges to federal
agency action. Although state tort actions do not seek to control future actions by federal
officers, the substance and legality of officers' past actions are nonetheless directly at issue.
261. Under the FTCA, the United States is substituted for federal employees found to
be acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1) (2006), and suit
under the FTCA is the exclusive remedy allowed for nonconstitutional torts committed by
federal officers, id. § 2679(b) (1); see also Waxman & Morrison, supra note 207, at 2242-43
(discussing FTCA). The FTCA also prohibits liability for actions taken by federal
employees involving performance or nonperformance of a discretionary function. 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a); see also Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 259, at 123 ("Congress, by
transforming claims for law enforcement (and other) torts into claims against the United
States under the FICA, has largely eliminated state common law remedies as a relevant
source of relief for individuals who have suffered a constitutional injury." (footnote
omitted)). For discussion of other statutes allowing recovery for tortious misconduct, see
Lester S. Jayson & Robert C. Longstreth, Handling Federal Tort Claims § 2.05 (2004).
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (stating liability is determined "in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred").
263. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 401-02 (1871) (describing question
presented as "whether a State court commissioner has jurisdiction... to inquire into the
validity of . . . [soldiers'] enlistment . . . and to discharge them from such service");
McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604 (1821) (addressing how "a State
tribunal can . . . issu[e] a mandamus to the [federal] register of a land office"); see also
McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 505 (1813) (describing, in predecessor case to
McClung in federal court, claim as mandamus action to force register to grant plaintiff
certificates of purchase for particular lands).
264. Mashaw, Federal Administration, supra note 260, at 1399-402, 1411-12; see also
Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and "The Democracy": Administrative Law from Jackson
to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 Yale L.J. 1568, 1669-84 (2008) (discussing limited availability
of mandamus during early nineteenth century).
265. Mashaw, Federal Administration, supra note 260, at 1399-400, 1407-10.
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forts in the form of injunctive relief yet allowing state tort actions thus
accords with views about the propriety of certain forms ofjudicial relief
that existed independent of the federal-state context. Thus, for example,
in Johnson v. Towsley, a suit over the validity of a land patent between two
private parties in which the Court defended the ability of the courts of
equity to correct mistakes in federal Land Office determinations, the fact
that the decision it was affirming was that of the Nebraska Supreme Court
26 6
did not factor into the Court's analysis.
The second, and perhaps even more important distinction, is between a constitutional prohibition on direct state targeting of federal officials and restrictions that rest on congressional statutes. As a matter of
constitutional structure, a categorical, constitutionally grounded prohibition would be at odds with the Madisonian Compromise, under which
"state courts would always be open to hear cases not given by Congress to
the federal courts." 267 The ultimate residual availability of the state
courts to hear federal claims is viewed today as fundamental to understanding the Constitution's grant to Congress of control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 268 But it is hard to see how the state courts
could play this role-at least in cases involving state enforcement of federal laws, such as Tarble's Case and McClung 69 -if as a constitutional matter state courts lacked jurisdiction to grant relief against federal officials.
Indeed, Tarble's Case has been much criticized as fundamentally at odds
with the Madisonian Compromise, as well as with original practice under
2 70
which state courts regularly entertained habeas challenges.
Little dispute exists, however, that Congress has authority to preempt
state action targeting federal agencies or federal officials. 2 71 In fact, the
266. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 83-84, 86, 91 (1871); see also Mashaw, Federal
Administration, supra note 260, at 1409-10 (discussing Johnson).
267. Redish & Woods, supra note 251, at 96.
268. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953) ("The state
courts always have a general jurisdiction to fall back on."); see also Michael G. Collins,
Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev.
39, 42-44 (discussing Madisonian compromise and understanding of state court role).
269. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409-12 (1871); McClung v. Silliman,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604-05 (1821); see also Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Fed. Reserve
Bank, 37 N.E.2d 225, 226 (N.Y. 1941) (denying states have power to "control the manner
in which a Federal agency performs or attempts to perform its functions and duties under
the Tariff Act or other Federal statute where the Federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction").
270. See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 251, at 402-03, 437-39
(scrutinizing Tarble's Case on these grounds); Pettys, supra note 250, at 294-96 (same). But
see Redish & Woods, supra note 251, at 50, 81-92 (concluding Tarble's Case represents
constitutional bar to certain forms of state relief against federal officers and remains good
law).
271. Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 251, at 390-91. Such congressional
restrictions on state action are quite different from the congressional efforts to force or
"commandeer" the states to implement federal regulation that the Court has invalidated
on federalism grounds. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (prohibiting
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overarching theme of commentary in this area is that it is ultimately up to
Congress to decide what role the states are to play in monitoring and
controlling the actions of federal officers. 2 72 Unsurprisingly, therefore,
Tarble's Case and McClung are often thought best understood as concluding that Congress had prohibited the types of state action involved, rather
than as invoking a constitutional prohibition. 2 73 Congress, moreover, has
acted, adopting several statutes that either preclude or significantly limit
direct application of state law to federal agencies and officers. Prime
among these are the FTCA's preclusion of state tort actions against fed274
eral officers found to be acting within the scope of their employment;
the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity for nonmonetary actions against
federal agencies brought in federal court;275 and the federal removal statute's grant of broad powers to federal officers to remove to federal court
state civil and criminal actions filed against them for acts committed
under color of their office. 276 As a statutory matter, the comprehensive
scheme that Congress has provided for remedying federal administrative
transgressions leaves little room or need for resort to state remedial
measures.
Congress's central role in structuring state involvement in federal
regulation suggests that a potentially fruitful way of understanding the
direct-indirect distinction is in terms of its operation as a constitutionally
inspired default rule, which can be trumped by Congress. 27 7 Under this
approach, absent congressional indication to the contrary, state measures
federal commandeering of state executive officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 166 (1992) (prohibiting federal commandeering of state legislatures).
272. See Pettys, supra note 250, at 296 & n.177 (collecting sources).
273. For arguments to this effect on Tarble's Case, see Amar, supra note 258, at
1509-10 (arguing Court's analysis in Tarble's Case and Ableman, the pre-Civil War decision
on which Tarble's Case relied, "was shaky, and its language quite sloppy" and concluding
these decisions "can be justified only if they are understood simply as attributing to
Congress a desire for exclusive federal court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings against
federal officers"); Waxman & Morrison, supra note 207, at 2224-27 (concluding similarly
Tarble's Case is best read as reflecting congressional determination to limit habeas
jurisdiction over federal officers to federal courts). But see Arnold, supra note 220, at
1390-93 (noting statutory basis of McClung but arguing that in Tarble's Case "Justice Field's
language indicates that the Constitution forbids state jurisdiction ex propriovigore"); Collins,
supra note 268, at 98-104 (concluding both Tarb/e's Case and McClung were originally
based in Constitution but noting statutory view avoids problems with constitutional
account); Redish & Woods, supra note 251, at 96-102 (defending Tarble's Case as
constitutionally based).
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 26 7 9(a) (2006).
275. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
276. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1); see also Arnold, supra note 220, at 1405 ("[F]ederal
officers have the protection of removal."); Waxman & Morrison, supra note 207, at
2228-30 (discussing removal statute).
277. For a similar constitutional-default-rule account of prohibitions on interstate
discrimination, see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120
Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1475 (2007) [hereinafter Metzger, Congress, Article IV] ("IT]he
antidiscrimination provisions of Article V are best understood, like the dormant
commerce clause, as constitutional default rules.").
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directly targeting federal agency decisions or seeking to control the actions of federal officials would be presumptively preempted, whereas indirect state measures would be presumptively valid. This formulation accords nicely with the preemption decisions, which invoked presumptions
against preemption in the context of measures affecting federal agencies
indirectly, as well as with Buckman, which deemed a presumption against
preemption inappropriate precisely because of the federal nature of the
activities targeted by state law. 278 Yet even a presumptive direct-indirect
distinction is ultimately unsustainable across the board. The problem is
not the presumptive validity of indirect state measures, but rather condemning as presumptively illegitimate all direct state targeting of federal
agencies. That would go well beyond existing precedent and statutory
measures, which focus instead on protecting the federal government
from state law intrusions that would impede the ability of federal agents
to function. 2 79 Thus, they prohibit efforts by states to "interrupt the acts
of the general government itself,"280 and limit the extent to which federal
officers and agencies face state law liability for their actions. 281 To be
sure, a concern with protecting against state law prohibitions and restrictions on the actions of federal officials supports viewing state law efforts
that seek to overturn or enjoin federal administrative actions as presumptively preempted. 28 2 These actions might well be deemed actually pre278. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48 (2001)
("[T]he relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently
federal in character ....

").

279. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-60 (1990) (noting, in suit between
private parties, state courts are "presumptively competent ... to adjudicate claims arising
under the laws of the United States" and thus "have concurrentjurisdiction 'where it is not
excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature
of the particular case'" (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876))). For a
skeptical view of implied preemption defenses of limits on state habeas jurisdiction over
federal officers, see Pettys, supra note 250, at 297-307.
280. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55 (1920).
281. See Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, at 3 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5947 ("The possible exposure of Federal employees
to personal liability could lead to a substantial diminution in the vigor of Federal law
enforcement and implementation."); see also Springer v. Bryant, 897 F.2d 1085, 1086-87
(11th Cir. 1990) (noting Congress passed Westfall Act creating absolute immunity for
federal employees who commit common law torts as a result of the "immediate crisis in
which all federal employees were confronted with the prospect of being held personally
liable for actions taken within the scope of their employment" and because Congress
feared "that this potential threat of personal liability and protracted tort litigation could
undermine the morale of federal employees and the effectiveness of the agencies in which
they were employed"). Insofar as state court suits target federal agencies rather than
federal officers, they likely would be barred by federal sovereign immunity, as the APA's
waiver of sovereign immunity would not apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (waiving
sovereign immunity for certain claims against the United States brought "in a court of the
United States").
282. Akhil Amar and Richard Arnold have rejected this proposition, arguing that such
state law actions against federal officials should be deemed constitutional and questioning
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empted by the APA and other federal statutes granting rights of action to
remedy arbitrary and unlawful agency action in federal court. This rationale, however, could not justify a presumption of preemption in the
Buckman situation, in which state law directly targeted federal agency
decisionmaking but did not (a) impose liability on any federal actor,
(b) render any federal decision legally invalid, or (c) purport to control
future federal agency action. Preemption of such actions could still result
from the substantive regulatory statute at issue (the FDCA in Buckman),
but certainly not from general federalism principles alone.
Even more plainly, these precedents and statutes do not support a
presumption against direct state targeting of federal administrative action
that takes the form of suits brought by state actors in federal court and
under federal law. A strong case could be made that such state conduct is
preferable to state efforts to influence federal agencies more indirectly.
Dangers of a single state imposing its policy preferences on the nation as
a whole are assuaged by the need to prove a claim under federal law to a
federal tribunal. At a minimum, barring statutory language to the contrary, states should be equally able to sue under statutes that provide
rights of action against federal officers or agencies in federal court, such
as the APA. Moreover, such state suits are regularly entertained, at least
when the state asserts an injury to its sovereign or proprietary interests,
such as federal imposition of unconstitutional requirements or federal
28 3
action that harms state property.
The situation is somewhat different when a state sues the federal government in its parens patriae capacity asserting quasi-sovereign interests,
including interests in obtaining benefits to which its residents are entitled
under federal law.284 In the past, the Court has rejected state parens patriae suits against the federal government on the grounds that "the
United States, not the State, represents the citizens as parens patriae in
their relations to the federal government." 285 The recent decision in
the correctness of decisions such as Tarble's Case to the contrary. See Amar, supra note
258, at 1504-17; Arnold, supra note 220, at 1401-03 (defending state court power to
enjoin federal officials).
283. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (deciding state suit
challenging federal regulation of states as unconstitutional); Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 277-78, 280 (1983) (deciding state suit against
federal government over title to river bed); see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 188,
at 1034-35 (advocating state standing based on "sovereign interest in preserving its own
law"); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387, 510
(1995) (advocating state standing when "Congress undermines [state sovereignty] by
forcing the states to legislate or to undertake other affirmative tasks").
284. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
607-08 (1982) (including benefits from federal statutes within category of quasi-sovereign
interests that state can assert in parens patriae action).
285. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 445-46, 450-52 (1945); see also
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) ("While the state, under some
circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its
duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the federal
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Massachusetts v. EPA calls this limit on such suits into question, however,
with the Court there not only upholding a state's suit against a federal
agency's failure to regulate but further invoking its parens patriae jurisprudence to justify its assertion of "special solicitude" for the states in
standing analysis. 28 6 According to the Massachusetts majority, the Court's
precedents at most bar state parens patriae suits that seek to protect state
residents from the operation of federal laws, not suits in which states seek
to assert rights under those federal laws. 28 7 In any event, the undeniable
ability of states to sue federal agencies in federal court in other contexts
suffices to preclude any across-the-board presumption against states directly targeting federal administrative action through federal court
litigation.
In sum, an approach that views direct state targeting of federal action as presumptively preempted may well be appropriate as applied to
some state measures, such as suits in state court (based on either state or
federal law) that seek to control the future actions of federal officers or
federal agencies. But a presumptive approach is not justified across the
board; in particular, it is not sustainable as applied to contexts such as
Buckman (in which state law may directly target federal decisionmaking
without seeking to overturn agency decisions or impose liability on federal officers) or Summers (in which federal agencies are directly sued
under federal law in federal court). Thus, even this more modest approach fails to vindicate the direct-indirect distinction as a full explanation for the tension between the preemption decisions and these other
lines of jurisprudence.
3. Lessons from the Past: The Repeated Failureof Federalism-BasedDirectIndirect Distinctions. - The difficulty involved in justifying a categorical
federalism-based distinction between direct and indirect efforts to improve federal agencies should come as no surprise. Previous attempts to
use formalistic direct-indirect distinctions to navigate federal and state
relationships have also failed, and for many of the same reasons. Perhaps
the most prominent of these was the Court's effort to confine exercise of
Congress's commerce power to measures that directly targeted the movement of goods and services in interstate commerce and its prohibition on
government. In that field it is the United States, and not the state, which represents them
as parens patriae .... "). For a defense of the traditional approach, see Alexander M.
Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 86-90.
286. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-20 (2007); Calvin Massey, State Standing
After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 249, 264-66, 268 (2009) ("[T]he Court in
[Massachusetts] was actually saying that a state has standing to assert the rights of its
residents under federal law.").
287. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17; see also Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485 (leaving open
whether state may ever sue "to protect its citizens against any forms of enforcement of
unconstitutional acts of Congress"). For a thorough discussion of case law on state parens
patriae standing in suits against federal agencies before Massachusetts, see generally
Comment, State Standing to Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A Re-Examination
of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1069 (1977).
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congressional regulation of activities (such as manufacturing, mining, or
agriculture) that affected interstate commerce indirectly. 288 This effort
was combined with a less well-known mirror restriction on the states,
under which the Court invalidated state measures that it concluded directly targeted interstate commerce but sustained state legislation that
was deemed to affect interstate commerce only indirectly. 289 Both of

these direct-indirect distinctions failed to hold, for familiar reasons: the
lack of a clear divide between activities said to affect interstate commerce
directly as opposed to indirectly; and the extent to which supposedly indirect effects could vitiate federal efforts to regulate interstate commerce. 290 As a result, it became clear that these direct-indirect distinctions artificially constrained the legitimate sphere of federal and state
29 1
regulation.
Similarly here, the direct-indirect distinction suggested by the
Court's case law fits poorly with both practical reality and constitutional
principle. Of particular importance, the distinction embodies an unduly
narrow view of the states' legitimate scope of concern. The image of the
federal and state governments as occupying separate and independent
spheres of action articulated in Tarble's Case was cast aside by the New
Deal.2

92

The Court has now long acknowledged that the central federal-

ism dynamic is one of concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction-precisely
the reason that preemption has risen so prominently to the fore. 293 As
288. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (finding act
unconstitutional that sought to "regulate and minimize . . . local controversies and evils
affecting local work" and that "[s]uch effect as they may have upon commerce, however
extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect"); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) ("In determining how far the federal government may go
in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate
commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and indirect
effects.").
289. See, e.g., Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 402, 410-11
(1913) (permitting state law "extend[ing] incidentally" to "interstate business"); see also
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1089, 1110-20 (2000) (discussing this line of cases); Brannon P. Denning,
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 417, 443
(2008) (noting direct-indirect test).
290. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding commerce power can
reach purely intrastate activities); NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 40
(1937) (holding commerce power extends to intrastate activities that have "close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce"). See generally Cushman, supra note 289, at
1094-100 (tracing development of direct-indirect distinction).
291. See Cushman, supra note 289, at 1094 (noting direct-indirect distinction
"appears artificial, wooden, even silly"); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing direct-indirect cases as "applying highly
formalistic notions of 'commerce'").
292. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism 37-47, 55 (2009) (tracing
federalism developments from Lochner era through New Deal and Civil Rights eras).
293. Cf. Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2072 ("Given the overlapping
character of federal and state regulatory power, most substantive determinations by federal
agencies hold the potential to displace state law ...."). Recognition that the states may
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the range of legitimate federal regulatory authority has expanded, so too
has the scope of legitimate state interest and involvement in federal regulation. The success or failure of federal regulatory efforts has a profound
effect upon the "States qua States." 294 Federal agency failures can result
in the states themselves having to undertake regulatory action or face substantial public expenditures, in part given the states' roles in federal regulatory programs. 29 5 States also have a significant interest in the success of
federal regulatory efforts because those efforts often displace state mea296
sures and render the states unable to regulate in their own right.
Massachusetts emphasized this point, noting the possibility of preemption
as one reason why states are "entitled to special solicitude in our standing
2 97
analysis."

operate as a direct check on the federal government dates back to the Federalist Papers.
The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("In the
compound republic of America. ... [t]he different governments will control each other, at
the same time that each will be controlled by itself.").
294. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847 (1976).
295. For example, northeastern states challenged the Bush Administration's ozone
standards as too lax, arguing that the effect was to increase these states' burdens in
meeting emissions standards under the CAA. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861,
865 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Evidence in the record demonstrates that states in the eastern
United States have difficulty attaining ozone standards because of ozone ... emissions in
upwind states."). States have also sued the Department of Health and Human Services to
prohibit its adoption of more restrictive regulations under the State Children's Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP). See Christopher Lee, N.J. Wants Rules for Health Plan
Blocked: Lawsuit Says Children Would Suffer, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 2007, at A3 (describing
state suit challenging federal implementation of SCHIP program). Even outside of such
cooperative programs, federal regulatory failures can force state responses; states today are
faced with communities devastated by the subprime mortgage scandal and failure of
federal oversight. See Nicholas Bagley, Subprime Safeguards We Needed, Wash. Post, Jan.
25, 2008, at A19 ("To combat this surge in predatory lending, some state legislatures
decided to stanch the flow of easy credit to subprime lenders."); Michael Powell, Federal
Judge Rejects Suit by Baltimore Against Bank, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2010, at All (noting
federal judge dismissed Baltimore's lawsuit against Wells Fargo because "the city could not
prove that the bank's lending practices had resulted in broad damage to poor
neighborhoods").
296. See Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner at 2, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (No. 05-1342) (arguing
if regulation at issue "is allowed to stand, it would render States powerless to protect their
residents from abusive and discriminatory consumer practices" and that "OCC would
usurp that function, even though it is ill-equipped to perform it"); Brief of the States of
Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 21, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120) ("[W]hen administrative decisions have the potential to
preempt state law and thus interfere with the State's interest in creating and enforcing its
own legal code, States are injured, and it is the administrative decision that causes that
injury.").
297. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519-20.
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B. Federalismfor the Future: A Special State Role in Monitoring and
Improving FederalAdministration?
The inadequacies of the direct-indirect distinction in explaining the
Court's varying jurisprudence leaves open a more radical possibility:
Rather than attempting to fit the recent preemption decisions within the
Court's existing precedent, perhaps they are better understood as representing a shift in the Court's views. Along with Massachusetts, the decisions could signal that the Court has adopted a new understanding of
federal-state relations under which the states have a special role in monitoring and improving federal administration.
The idea that the states may have such a role to play in checking and
reforming federal administration is intriguing. But substantial analytic
and normative work remains to be done for such an account to be viable.
The Court itself has provided little clarification of what such a role for the
states might mean in practice or of its implications for existing jurisprudence. In addition, it has almost wholly failed to justify why the states
should be assigned any such role-and more specifically, why the responsibility for assigning them a role falls to the Court rather than to
Congress.
1. The Scope and Implications of a Special State Role. - The strongest
support for the view that the Court may be assigning the states a special
role in reforming federal administration comes in Massachusetts. There,
the Court repeatedly invoked the "special position and interest" of the
states in concluding that the states are "entitled to special solicitude in
our standing analysis. '298 Massachusetts indicates the states should be accorded special access to federal court in order to challenge federal
agency action. But the exact contours of this access remain obscure.
On the one hand, it seems unlikely that the Court intended to free
the states entirely from traditional standing requirements when they seek
to challenge federal agency action. After emphasizing the importance of
state status, the majority proceeded to analyze whether Massachusetts,
like a private litigant, had demonstrated sufficient injury, causation, and
redressability to have standing. 299 Moreover, freeing the states from
these requirements entirely would set up a stark contest between federalism and separation of powers principles, as the Court has held they represent the minima necessary for a challenge to satisfy Article III's "case
298. Id. at 518, 520.
299. See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 188, at 1033, 1036 (concluding
Massachusetts still requires satisfaction of traditional standing requirements, but using less
restrictive analysis); see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 188, at 1779 ("It is unlikely
that the Court meant to abolish standing for states ....");Massey, supra note 286, at
261-62, 271-72 (arguing Massachusetts allows states to sue on generalizable interests, but
some injury requirement remains). But see Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State:
Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 826-30 (2009)
(arguing parens patriae and Lujan analyses in Massachusetts were separate and suggesting
traditional standing analysis does not apply to state assertion of quasi-sovereign interests).
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or controversy" limitation on federal jurisdiction. 30 0 Even the parens patriae jurisprudence on which the Court relies necessitates some showing
beyond "[t]he mere fact that a state is the plaintiff' for suit to lie. 30 1 A
state must demonstrate that its quasi-sovereign interests are implicated,
which would appear to necessitate some showing of at least potential
harm to the health and economic well-being of its residents or their ability to obtain the benefits of federal law.30 2 Not surprisingly, lower court
decisions since Massachusetts have held that the decision does not excuse
states from meeting the traditional Article III requirements for
30 3
standing.
On the other hand, the Court's treatment of whether Massachusetts
met these requirements was notably lenient. It sustained Massachusetts's
right to sue based on fairly generalized and speculative claims of injury
and causation, expressly tying its analysis of these requirements to
Massachusetts's state status. 30 4 Equally important is Massachusetts's holding that states could sue federal agencies as parens patriae to assert the
rights of their residents under federal statutes. 30 5 Further, Massachusetts's
lenient approach to satisfying Article III requirements suggests that states
may be able to bring such parens patriae suits without having to show that
their residents had suffered identifiable harms clearly traceable to federal
30 6
regulatory failure or redressable by regulatory action.
Thus, Massachusetts may presage dramatically expanded access to the
federal courts for state suits challenging federal administrative action, as30 7
suming a majority of Justices continue to adhere to its approach.
Wyeth, in turn, may push this access even further, with its approval of state
efforts to improve the overall functioning of federal agencies. Combined,
these decisions could lead to a significant qualification on the Summers
line of precedent, with states being found to have standing to bring the
kind of overall challenges to agency functioning and policy that the federal courts have previously refused to entertain. To be sure, several of the
300. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).
301. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927).
302. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602,
607-08 (1982) (describing characteristics of quasi-sovereign interest).
303. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Del. Dep't
of Natural Res. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 558 F.3d 575, 579 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
304. See Massey, supra note 286, at 255-61 (discussing Massachusetts's "uniquely
relaxed interpretation" of standing analysis).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 284-287.
306. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 188, at 1775-80 (arguing for this as result
of Massachusetts); Massey, supra note 286, at 268-71 (arguing, post-Massachusetts,
"generalized injury is sufficient to constitute quasi-sovereign injury"); Weinstock, supra
note 299, at 826-28 (arguing Massachusetts "treated damage to state-owned property as
surplus to a parens patriae action").
307. Cf. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 132, at 70, 92-96 (arguing decision in
Massachusetts is driven by Court's perception of politicized decisionmaking in context of
urgent regulatory need and special state standing may not expand much beyond that
case).
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decisions holding such challenges nonjusticiable have rested on grounds
other than standing, specifically a lack of ripeness or of final agency action. 30 8 But it is hard to see why a special solicitude for the states that
allows them greater ease in satisfying constitutional standing requirements would not result in the states being granted more leeway with re30 9
spect to these jurisdictional obstacles as well.
For example, it is not hard to imagine that states would be able to
sue to challenge an agency's policy on preemption, even prior to a specific preemption challenge arising. Such a suit-which could be seen as
asserting either a state's sovereign interest in its own power to govern or
its quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from harms-draws
particular support from Massachusetts'sreference to preemption as a basis
for according states special solicitude in assessing standing. 3 10 But in addition, states might be able to challenge an agency's general failure to
comply with statutory requirements or perform its statutorily assigned responsibilities adequately. To use the statutory context of Wyeth as an example, perhaps states could sue the FDA over its poor record in monitoring drugs post-approval. Agency failure of this sort could pose a threat to
the well-being of state residents, supporting standing under Massachusetts,
and Wyeth sanctioned the use of state law to achieve a similar agencyreforming effect.
Wyeth also suggests that a special state role in monitoring and improving federal administration might not be limited to the federal court
context, but instead could extend to efforts to reform federal agencies
through use of state law. Recognizing such a state role might lead the
Court to uphold state law measures like the fraud-on-the-FDA claims at
issue in Buckman, which aim to use state law liability to protect federal
agency decisionmaking or reinforce federal standards. It might also sup308. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-37 (1998)
(unripe); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990) (no final action).
309. In particular, deference to a state's assessment of when its quasi-sovereign
interests are implicated may make it easier for states to demonstrate that their claims are
ripe and also that an agency action sufficiently represents the agency's official position to
allow for challenge. For examples of private litigants hindered by these jurisdictional
obstacles, see Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808-12
(2003) (concluding challenge to agency policy statement was unripe due to lack of
hardship, even though policy statement was final agency action); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 177-78 (1997) (requiring final agency action subject to suit under APA to be
"consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process" and "one by which . . . legal
consequences will flow" (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
310. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519-20 (2007); see also Alfred L. Snapp
& Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (quasi-sovereign
interest); Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008)
(sovereign interest);Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1015,
1073-74 (2010) (arguing Massachusetts'sspecial state standing is best read as allowing states
to challenge "null preemption," or preemption that creates a regulatory void). State suits
to challenge preemption had sometimes been allowed before Massachusetts. See, e.g.,
Alaska v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443-44 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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port taking a broad view of the states' ability to enforce federal standards. 31 1 A special state role conceivably could extend even further to
authorizing state court efforts seeking directly to control federal agency
decisionmaking, such as the state habeas and mandamus actions at issue
in Tarble's Case and McClung, though such a move would represent quite a
dramatic departure from current practice. Of course, Congress could
preempt any state law effort to police federal agency action, and thus, cast
as interpretations of the federal statutes at issue, Buckman and these earlier precedents might still stand. Yet to the extent these decisions embody the broader proposition that policing federal agency action is not
an appropriate state function, the Court's view would now be quite different. 3 12 State law targeting of federal agency action could become presumptively available, absent express preemption or a relatively clear case
of federal-state law conflict.
As a result, assigning the states a special role with respect to reforming federal administration has the potential to work a dramatic
change in existing practice and precedent. That is perhaps reason
enough to proceed cautiously before reading the preemption decisions
in this fashion, absent clearer indications from the Court that it intends
such a move.
2. Justifying a Special State Role. - An equally serious weakness is the
Court's failure so far to provide ajustification for assigning the states such
a special role. One might defend such a role on several different
grounds. One possible basis is the belief that states are likely to be particularly effective monitors of agencies and instigators of administrative
change. States gain special knowledge about federal administrative deficiencies from frequent involvement in implementing federal programs,
as well as from their own independent regulatory undertakings.3 1 3 States
may have substantial access to Congress through their state representatives, allowing them to raise concerns about federal agency actions and

311. See Widman, supra note 142 (manuscript at 4-5, 36-40) (advocating state
enforcement of federal regulations).
312. As noted above, the contrast between Wyeth and Buckman, as well as the split
summary affirmance in Desiano, suggest some movement away from such a strong view of
Buckman. See supra text accompanying notes 169-170.
313. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
Yale L.J. 1256, 1288 (2009) (advocating "uncooperative federalism" in which "states can
take advantage of the connective ties that bind them to federal officials" which in turn
"yield [s] knowledge of the system and personal relations with the people best positioned to
change the policy"); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism,
and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692, 1698-703 (2001)
(discussing rationales for cooperative enforcement of national regulatory regimes); supra
text accompanying notes 294-297 (discussing state interest and role in federal regulatory

programs).
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perhaps prompt federal oversight. 3 14 States also have the capacity to sue
31 5
if needed, particularly when they partner with other states.
Yet although these features could empower states as federal agency
overseers, they do not suffice to differentiate all states in all contexts.
States may lack any special knowledge in areas in which they are inactive,
and inevitably some states will have far superior expertise and resources
than others. Moreover, public interest organizations-like the environmental groups who initially petitioned the EPA to regulate greenhouse
gases in Massachusetts or who sought to challenge the Forest Service's
practices in Summers-also often have extensive expertise, deep knowledge of how federal programs are operating, substantial litigating capac316
ity, and close connections to Congress.
What does differentiate the states from private litigants is their political accountability. State challenges to federal administrative action are
overwhelmingly brought by state attorneys general who are accountable
to the voters in their states for how they direct the resources of their
offices.3 1 7 However, political accountability is very much a two-edged
sword. It may act as a constraint on excessive litigation, thus limiting the
disruptive potential on federal agencies of allowing states special court
access. 31 8 Alternatively, as the current healthcare reform litigation dem314. See Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 Urb. Law. 301,
335-36 (1988) ("[IInstitutional linkages help to secure access and attention for state and
local concerns."); see also Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 59, at 762 (noting state
organizations, such as National Governors' Association and National Conference of State
Legislatures, "seem well-positioned to have their voices heard in [congressional]
decisionmaking").
315. See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of the
State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1998, 2003-07 (2001)
(discussing development of cooperation among state attorneys general).
316. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal
Protection, 58 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 43 (2007) ("[P]ublic interest organizations are far and
away the best plaintiffs in environmental cases for the relatively greater resources and
expertise they can bring to the court on . . .highly complex issues."). But see Peter M.
Lavigne, The Movement for American Ecosystem Restoration and Interactive
Environmental Decisionmaking: Quagmire, Diversion, or Our Last, Best Hope?, 17 Tul.
Envtl. L.J. 1, 44 (2003) ("[M]ost environmental NGOs do not have the resources to match
business interests in expertise, training, or staff time.").
317. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 188, at 1783-85 ("State AGs must respond
to a broad range of constituents and therefore have incentive to serve the public
interest."); Massey, supra note 286, at 274-75 & n.103 ("State attorneys general have
limited resources and are politically constrained.").
318. See Lemos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 37) (arguing "state enforcement
seems significantly less prone to overenforcement than ... private enforcement"); Massey,
supra note 286, at 279 ("An attorney general who devotes inordinate attention to litigation
of public rights in federal court . . .may encounter voter discontent."). Moreover, the
political accountability of states need not undermine the effectiveness of states as a check
on federal agency failure or capture by regulated interests, as the political constituencies to
which the states respond may be different from those which are most effective at the
federal level. See Hills, Against Preemption, supra note 24, at 23 (noting different mix of
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onstrates, their political accountability may also prompt state officials to
bring suit to challenge federal actions that are unpopular in their
states. 3 19 The political accountability of state officials also underscores
that states' views about what constitutes agency failure are likely to be
ideologically driven. Thus states will often disagree on this question, and
allowing states a special agency-policing role may well result in legal chal320
lenges with different states on opposing sides.
In any event, even if states were particularly effective monitors of federal agencies, that fact alone does not suffice to justify a decision by the
Court to assign them a special agency-reforming role. Functional calculations of this sort fall within the purview of the political branches. As a
result, the Court needs some basis in federal law-statutory, regulatory,
or constitutional-for injecting states into this role. Not surprisingly,
therefore, in Massachusetts the Court invoked constitutional federalism as
authority for special state standing, emphasizing the "sovereign prerogatives" states surrender to the federal government-including the ability to
protect their interests through force, foreign negotiations, and in some
instances, domestic regulation. 32 1 A state's inability to use force against
sister states to protect itself is a common justification for parens patriae
jurisdiction in the federal courts. 322 Substantial support similarly exists
for concluding the Framers intended the federal courts to serve as an
alternative forum for resolving interstate disputes, including Article III's
provision for diversity jurisdiction and for disputes involving a state as a
party to come within the Court's original jurisdiction. 323 But Congress
was also expected to play a central-indeed, the central-role in resolving
interstate disputes, 3 24 and political safeguards of state interests in
Congress are acknowledged to form their primary protection against
constituencies at state and federal level); Widman, supra note 142 (manuscript at 43)
(same).
319. See Editorial, Health Care Reform and the Courts, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2010, at
A26 (noting "many of the [attorneys general] behind these suits are running for reelection or higher office," including lead plaintiff, Florida's Attorney General Bill
McCollum); see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 188, at 1783-84 (discussing
political impact of Massachusetts on state attorney general elections and interstate
cooperation); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA,
112 Penn St. L. Rev. 1, 47-50 (2007) (same).
320. Cf. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 154 (manuscript at 12-17) (detailing how
various states may have incentives to over- or underregulate, depending on their
relationship to activity being regulated).
321. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007).
322. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
323. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (defining jurisdiction of federal courts); see also
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (discussing these various
provisions for federal jurisdiction); The Federalist No. 80, supra note 293, at 478-81
(Alexander Hamilton) (same).
324. See Metzger, Congress, Article IV, supra note 277, at 1475-76, 1479 (explaining
Congress's central role as justified by "precedent, federalism values, functional concerns,
and history").
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harmful federal enactments. 325 Thus, simply the fact that the states have
ceded sovereign prerogatives to the federal government does not necessarily translate into greater access to federal court for states seeking to challenge federal action.
A stronger constitutional argument, both for expanded federal court
access and for a special role for the states in policing federal administration more broadly, is that the delegation of extensive policymaking responsibilities to agencies eviscerates the political checks traditionally relied upon to defend state interests. On this account, ensuring states
access to federal court to challenge federal administrative action is neces3 26
sary to preserve constitutional federalism in the administrative era.
This argument has surfaced most forcefully in the administrative preemption debate, with scholars justifying independent judicial determination
of preemption issues on the grounds that agencies lack sensitivity to state
interests. 327 I have elsewhere questioned whether federal agencies are
actually as unresponsive and opposed to state interests as these arguments
suggest, but part of what ensures agency attentiveness to the states is the
potential for judicial review and reversal.3 28 More generally, it makes
sense to conclude that special protections for the states must develop in
the administrative realm if federalism is to have continuing relevance in
the world of national administrative governance that increasingly domi329
nates today.
Importantly, however, this justification assumes a critical point: that
courts can legitimately update the federal-state relationship to take account of modern administrative realities on their own, rather than leaving that task to Congress. To be sure, constitutional federalism norms
may well provide some justification for such a move, and courts regularly
interpret federal statutes with an eye towards constitutional values, with
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance being a prime example. 33 0 But
constitutional avoidance has come in for substantial criticism as judicial
325. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548-55 (1985)
(discussing such safeguards); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (same).
326. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 286, at 267 ("[T]he question of who has standing to
challenge the exercise of that discretion should be informed by the disconnection between
Congress and administrative agencies."); see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 188, at
1036-37 (describing protection of state laws "from being trumped by federal agency
action" as "possible sovereign interest").
327. See, e.g., Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 27, at 721-22; Merrill,
Institutional Choice, supra note 27, at 755-57.
328. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2072-91. For similar skepticism
and defense of agencies as attentive to state interests, see Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note
27, at 1948-83; Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 67, at 2146-55.
329. Cf. Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2090-100 (defending use of
administrative law to address federalism concerns).
330. Id. at 2091-96. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy
of Freestanding Federalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 98 (2009), available at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/LWebsite-Contentfor-jenniferForumVol._l22Metzgermetzger.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (responding to John
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aggrandizement precisely because of its free-floating constitutionalism. 331
Hence, at a minimum judicial authority to import federalism values into
administrative contexts requires a defense that the Court has yet to supply-indeed, it has not articulated an administrative federalism argument
332
along these lines at all.
Such a defense is especially needed because of the separation of powers implications of assigning the states a special agency-policing role. As
noted above, animating the Summers line are concerns about restricting
judicial intrusion into administrative policysetting and management, on
the grounds that administrative decisions of this sort are the responsibility of elected officials and involve issues the courts are institutionally illequipped to resolve. 333 Allowing states greater access to challenge federal agency policy and functioning in federal court thus would entail potentially significant trumping of these separation of powers concerns in
the name of federalism. 33 4 That separation of powers requirements may
need to bend to accommodate federalism is certainly a possible constitutional outcome; these are, after all, both core constitutional structural
principles.3 35 But the appropriate balance between federalism and separation of powers concerns, and the responsibility of the courts in striking
that balance as opposed to Congress, are central issues that the Court
must address if indeed it intends to assign the states this role.
An alternative approach that focused more centrally on Congress
would at least mitigate many of these concerns about judicial overstepping. Congress clearly has power to assign states a special role in particular federal regulatory schemes, as is evident in recent enactments authorizing expanded state enforcement of federal regulatory requirements. 3 36
Manning's opposition to "invocation of abstract or freestanding federalism in
constitutional interpretation").
331. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816 (1983) ("The practical effect of interpreting
statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is... to create ajudge-made constitutional
'penumbra' . . . [a]nd we do not need that."); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited,
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 89-90 (explaining why doctrine of constitutional avoidance from
Ashwander "is in fact triply problematic"); see also John F. Manning, Federalism and the
Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2005-09
(2009) (arguing Court's invocation of free-floating federalism values in constitutional
interpretation is at odds with its turn towards textualism and rejection of purposivism in
statutory interpretation).
332. Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2101, 2107-09.
333. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
334. Cf. Bickel, supra note 285, at 89-90 ("It would make a mockery . . . of the
constitutional requirement of case or controversy . . . to countenance automatic
litigation-and automatic it would surely become-by states . . . . The consequent
aggrandizement of the judicial function is something to contemplate.").
335. See Massey, supra note 286, at 273-76 (noting "both separation of powers and
federalism are structural doctrines designed to check concentration of power" and should
"join" in reaching that end).
336. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1042, 124 Stat. 1376, 2012-14 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552)
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Congress also can provide that "broad regulations ... [are] to be the
object of judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt."33 7 Moreover, Congress has some
leeway to provide for suits that, absent such authorization, would be
deemed to involve too generalized a grievance to be appropriately raised
338
in federal court.
Whether this emphasis on Congress represents a plausible account
of the Court's recent decisions is another matter, however. In fact, it is
hard to view Massachusetts in this vein, given that the Court there made
no mention of the central role Congress assigned the states in implementing the CAA and instead justified the states' special standing on
their position in our constitutional order.339 In addition, this approach
leaves unanswered why the Court concluded that Congress intended the
states to play an agency-policing role in Wyeth and the recent preemption
decisions, but not in Buckman. Thus, even for this alternative account to
work the Court must provide greater clarification about the basis on
which it will infer that Congress intended the states to serve as federal
agency reformers.
CONCLUSION

The recent preemption decisions reveal a Court struggling to forge a
coherent doctrinal account of the relationship between the states and
federal agencies. The decisions are notable for their willingness to consider federal agency failure in preemption analysis. But the Court offers
little explanation of why it is more comfortable using state law to reform
overall agency performance here than in other contexts. Although a distinction between direct and indirect efforts at agency reform seems at
(providing state attorneys general may bring suit in federal district court to enforce
statutory requirements or regulations issued under the Act); id. § 111(b)(2)(C)-(E)
(providing state insurance commissioner, banking supervisor, and securities commissioner
shall be nonvoting members of new Financial Stability Oversight Council); Widman, supra
note 142 (manuscript at 16-17) (describing provisions for state enforcement in Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008); see also Lemos, supra note 109 (manuscript at
8-9) (listing other federal statutes authorizing state enforcement).
337. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
338. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (finding congressional
.power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before" (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S
555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
339. See id. at 518-20; see also Stevenson, supra note 319, at 8-9 (noting this role as
possible justification for state standing); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 188, at 1038-39
(arguing Court should have emphasized provisions allowing California to obtain waiver for
its emission limits, which other states could follow). The Court did invoke congressional
enactments in its standing analysis, underscoring that Congress had provided a procedural
right authorizing challenges to agency action unlawfully withheld. Massachusetts, 549 U.S.
at 517-18, 520. As other commentators have noted, the Court's characterization of this
right as "procedural" is questionable. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 188, at
1747-52. More importantly here, that procedural right was in no way limited to the states.
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first to offer an appealing justification for the Court's approach, on more
sustained analysis it proves inadequate. As a result, defending the preemption decisions may require invoking a more radical conception of the
states as having a special role to play in reforming federal administration.
But for now that suggestion remains implicit and inchoate. Future decisions-particularly in the preemption context, but also those at the intersection of federalism and separation of powers-will reveal whether this
view of the states' role becomes a more vibrant part of the Court's federalism and administrative law jurisprudence.

